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USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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CAREER, BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON USSR DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 5-9

[Unattributed article: "Service to the Motherland (on the Occasion of the 75th Birthday of the Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov*)"]

[Text] The life and activities of Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov have been inseparably linked with the deeds and accomplishments of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, to the strengthening of the nation's defense capability and to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Dmitriy Fedorovich was born in a worker family, having imbibed a love for work from it. His childhood was spent when the Great October Socialist Revolution was occurring and a fierce struggle was being waged against the interventionists and the White Guards. The three elder brothers of Dmitriy--Petr, Nikolay and Ivan--took an active part in the defense of Soviet power on the fronts of the Civil War.

At the age of 14, Dmitriy Ustinov volunteered for the Red Army. His youth was spent in fierce engagements against the Basmaks and counterrevolutionary rabble. During these years he received good political tempering and became a Komsomol member.

After serving in the Army, D. F. Ustinov entered a vocational-technical school and later worked as a machinist at the Balakhna Paper Combine where in 1927 he joined the ranks of the Communist Party. A thirst for knowledge and a desire to take an active part in the construction of socialism and in the defense of its victories led the young man to the Leningrad Military Mechanical Institute which he completed successfully in 1934. After his studies, the young engineer worked at the Naval Artillery Scientific Research Institute.

At that time, our nation was living through an important stage in its history. The foundation of socialism had been built in the Soviet Union. On the basis of socialist industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution, the national economy was being rebuilt. At the same time,

* Detailed biographic data on D. F. Ustinov can be found in: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1978, pp 20-25.

energetic measures were being taken to strengthen national defense capability in view of the growing threat of imperialist aggression. One such measure was the construction of a large Soviet navy capable of securely defending its sea frontiers.

Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov took a direct part in working out and creating new types of weapons for the young Soviet Navy and these proved themselves during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

In the aim of strengthening the engineer and design personnel at the enterprises, the party sent the best trained specialists there. D. F. Ustinov was sent to the Bolshevik Plant, where he headed the bureau of operations and experimental work and was the deputy chief designer. At the plant, not only were the great engineer and design abilities of D. F. Ustinov widely apparent, but also his ability to direct people and production. In 1938, he was appointed the director of this plant. A year later, the Bolshevik Plant for the successful fulfillment of production plans received the Order of Lenin. And its director also was presented a high decoration of the motherland.

As one of the prominent organizers of socialist industry, the party promoted D. F. Ustinov to the position of USSR people's commissar of weaponry. Resting on the shoulders of the 30-year-old people's commissar was the enormous responsibility for directing the work of the broad range of the defense sectors of industry. At that time the People's Commissariat of Weaponry was in charge of the designing, testing and production of field, naval, antitank and antiaircraft artillery, the cannon and machine gun weapons for the Air Forces, all systems of tank weapons and small arms, optical sights and cartridges. Actually, the fire power and combat capability of the ground forces, the aviation and navy depended upon the quantity and quality of the product supplied by the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Weaponry.

The appointing of D.F. Ustinov as the people's commissar of weaponry occurred just 2 weeks before the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR. Much had to be done to increase the pace and broaden the production of weapons. First of all it was essential to sharply increase the output of antiaircraft weapons, antitank weapons, tank and aviation cannons and small arms.

The question of the continuous supply of combat equipment, weapons and ammunition to the operational army was constantly at the center of attention of the Politburo of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, the State Defense Committee [GKO] and the USSR Council of People's Commissars [SNK]. D. F. Ustinov, in carrying out the demands of the party and the Soviet government of everything for the front, everything for victory, unstintingly and creatively devoted all his strength and knowledge to organizing a further increase in the production of weapons and ammunition.

The reorganizing of industrial production to a wartime footing in 1941 was complicated by the fact that a larger portion of the plants of the People's Commissariat of Weaponry was being shifted to the interior of the nation. D. F. Ustinov directly led their evacuation and the establishing of military product output in the new locations. In the fierce clash against Nazi Germany and its satellites, with the unfavorable balance of economic potentials, the Soviet

Union succeeded in a very short period of time of successfully carrying out the main task of achieving superiority in the production of weapons. The collectives from the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Weaponry achieved high indicators. Even by mid-1942, in comparison with the second half of 1941, at the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Weaponry, the production of field artillery increased by 2-fold, antitank artillery by 4-fold, and machine pistols and antitank rifles by 6-fold.¹ These indicators were achieved due to the precise organization of management and interaction in all the levels and subunits of the People's Commissariat of Weaponry and to subordinating the activities of all the employees, from the people's commissar down to the last worker, to the interests of defeating the Nazi invaders.

In 1942, D. F. Ustinov and a number of highly placed workers in the People's Commissariat of Weaponry received the high title of Hero of Socialist Labor for outstanding achievements in organizing the production and development of new types of artillery weapons and small arms and for able leadership of the defense plants. In the same year, he was also awarded the military rank of lieutenant general of the engineer-technical service.

In the course of the war, there was a continuous improvement in the production of artillery systems, mortars, small arms and ammunition. A predominant number of the new types of artillery weapons and around one-half of all the types of small arms were developed and put into series production during the war. The calibers of the tank and antitank artillery produced by the People's Commissariat of Weaponry increased by almost 2-fold while the armor penetration of the shells rose by approximately 5-fold.

The development of new types of weapons and the initiating of their production were carried out in a short period of time. The people's commissar himself often with a group of specialists traveled to organize this work on the spot. The obtained experience was immediately extended to other enterprises and design bureaus. It took just a week for the designers of the 85-mm cannon, along with workers from the tank and artillery industry and with the active personal involvement of D. F. Ustinov, to redesign the weapon, to mount it on a tank, to test it and then organize series output.

The creative and organizational work of the people's commissar of weaponry was highly regarded. In 1944, D. F. Ustinov was awarded the military rank of colonel general of the engineer and technical service.

The industry of the People's Commissar of Weaponry under the leadership of D. F. Ustinov during the war period surpassed the average annual production of Nazi Germany by more than 2-fold for field artillery pieces, by 5-fold for mortars and by 2.6-fold for antitank weapons.² The Soviet artillery systems and small arms also surpassed the Nazi ones in terms of quality. The guns and mortars were produced in a quantity making it possible during the offensive operations in the concluding period of the Great Patriotic War to create a density of 3-4-fold higher per kilometer of front than in organizing the Stalingrad Counteroffensive. The artillery and tanks were capable of destroying the Nazi "Tigers," "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" while the ground attack aviation could make destructive strikes against enemy troops. This was the difficult feat of the employees of the USSR People's Commissariat of Weaponry in the war years. This was also largely an accomplishment of D. F. Ustinov.

With victory in the Great Patriotic War, the party raised the people to rebuild and further develop the national economy. At the same time, it also took into account the arms race which had developed after World War II in the capitalist world. The scientists, designers and workers of the defense industry were confronted with the important task of providing the Soviet Armed Forces with modern weapons and combat equipment.

D. F. Ustinov, in the position of the USSR Minister of Weaponry (1946-1952), the Minister of the Defense Industry (1953-1957), the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers (1957-1963) and the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the USSR VSNKh [All-Union Council of the National Economy] (1963-1965), coordinated and directed the work of the scientific institutions, design bureaus and industrial enterprises in the aim of most fully carrying out the assignments to strengthen the economic and defense potential of the USSR.

The most dangerous for the USSR and the socialist countries on the European Continent was the nuclear blackmail from the United States. The USSR was forced to adopt effective measures to ensure its security in developing atomic and then thermonuclear weapons and dependable carriers for them, that is, various classes of missiles.

During these years, upon party assignment, D. F. Ustinov took an active part in organizing missile construction and in developing other weapons for the Army and Navy. In the USSR a new Armed Service, the Strategic Rocket Troops, was established as a dependable shield for our motherland. Rocket building made it possible to bring man into space and successfully develop space for peaceful purposes.

In 1961, D. F. Ustinov was awarded a second Gold Medal of Hero of Socialist Labor for active organizational work in the development and successful launching of the world's first spaceship "Vostok" with a Soviet citizen on board.

For more than 10 years (from 1965 through 1976), Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov worked as the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Here also he showed unusual abilities as a prominent political and party worker, he fought actively for carrying out party policy and made a major contribution to carrying out its decisions in the area of the further all-round growth of the national economy, increasing the material and cultural level of the Soviet people and ensuring the security of the socialist state.

In April 1976, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government assigned D. F. Ustinov a new responsible area of work. He was appointed the USSR Minister of Defense. He was given the military rank of army general and on 30 July 1976, by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union. The activities of D. F. Ustinov in this high position were a vivid model of unstinting service to the Soviet Armed Forces and the cause of defending the socialist fatherland. He devoted all his energy and knowledge to further increasing combat readiness and to strengthening the might of the Army and Navy and demanded that the men steadily master the modern equipment and weapons, be able to employ them, improve their military skills, strengthen their ideological tempering and increase their

vigilance, organization and discipline. D. F. Ustinov delved deeply into the daily life of the Armed Forces, concentrating efforts on carrying out the plans for military and political training and on the organization and quality of party political work in the troops and fleets. He has given unflagging attention to the development of military science and military art and to an all-round improvement in command and control as a most important element in the high combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

For great services to the Communist Party and Soviet state in strengthening national defense during the years of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar period, by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 27 October 1978, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the presenting of an Order of Lenin and the medal Gold Star.

In the present difficult international situation, when the ultrareactionary U.S. imperialist forces have initiated an unprecedented rise in military preparations, particularly high vigilance and strong defenses are essential. "We in the future," stated the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "will do everything necessary to ensure the security of our nation, our friends and allies...."³ That our Armed Forces vigilantly guard the socialist fatherland and are in constant combat readiness is vivid proof of the great and fruitful work of D. F. Ustinov in the post of USSR Minister of Defense.

Mar SU D. F. Ustinov pays constant attention to the further development and strengthening of the combat alliance of the Warsaw Pact states and to increasing their defense capability.

D. F. Ustinov is the author of a number of different works and articles in the periodic press and the chairman of the Main Editorial Board of "Istoriya vtoroy mirivoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945]. The ideological, military-theoretical and practical importance of the published works of D. F. Ustinov is determined by the fact that they, from a principled Marxist-Leninist position, examine many urgent questions in the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the area of policy, economics and ideology and the most important problems of defending the socialist fatherland, strengthening its defense capability and further developing the Soviet Armed Forces.

D. F. Ustinov conducts extensive party work. Since 1952 he has been a member of the CPSU Central Committee. In March 1965, he was elected a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, in April 1966 he was elected a candidate member of the Politburo and from March 1976 a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. For many years he has been a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. D. F. Ustinov devotes his diverse knowledge and great experience in party and state work to carrying out the tasks of building a communist society, he participates in working out the party line in all areas of the nation's political, economic and cultural life and takes an active part in carrying out the program for building a communist society as worked out by the party and the Soviet government.

D. F. Ustinov is a representative of a glorious galaxy of Soviet leaders raised by the party, he is celebrating his 75th birthday in a flourishing of creative forces and full of energy and is steadily carrying out party policy in the development and strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces and in increasing our motherland's defense capability. He has received 10 Orders of Lenin, the Orders of Suvorov 1st Degree and Kutuzov 1st Degree, the orders of a number of socialist and other states as well as numerous medals. D. F. Ustinov is the winner of Lenin and State Prizes.

The loyal son of the Leninist party and the Soviet people, the prominent party, state and military leader Mar SU D. F. Ustinov sees the purpose of his life in wholeheartedly serving the motherland and the cause of communism.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Voenizdat, Vol 5, 1975, p 48.
- ² Ibid., Vol 12, 1982, p 168.
- ³ "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS 14-15 iyunya 1983 goda" [Materials of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 14-15 June 1983], Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, p 25.
- ⁴ "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979; "Otvesti ugrozu yadernoy voyny" [To Eliminate the Threat of Nuclear War], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982; "Military Detente--An Imperative of the Times," in: "Protiv mifa o 'sovetskoy voyennoy ugroze'" [Against the Myth of the "Soviet Military Threat"], Voenizdat, 1980; "On Guard for the Revolutionary Victories," in: "Na strazhe zavoyevaniy Oktyabrya" [On Guard for the Victories of October], Voenizdat, 1978 and others.

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WORLD WAR II: TRENDS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS EXAMINED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 16-22

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent, Col Gen V. Karpov and Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, Maj Gen N. Zubkov: "On Certain Trends in the Development of the Theory and Practice of Offensive Operations by Groups of Fronts"]

[Text] An operation by a group of fronts, as a new form of strategic operations, arose during the years of the Civil War. Thus, for the purpose of defeating the White Guard troops of Gen Denikin, according to the plan and under the leadership of the High Command of the Red Army at the end of 1919 and the start of 1920, a general offensive was carried out by the troops of the Southern and Southeastern Fronts.

During the prewar period, Soviet military theory worked out the questions of preparing and conducting a deep offensive operation. Initially it was conceived as an operation for an assault army and later as an offensive operation by a front which was considered a strategic field force.

The experience of the commenced World War II and the changes in the technical equipping and organizational structure of the Soviet Army's operational formations necessitated a clarification of views on the nature of strategic operations and the role of the fronts and armies in them. At a meeting of the leadership of the Armed Forces in December 1940, it was recognized that for attaining a major military-political or strategic goal it was essential to use the forces of not one but rather several cooperating fronts the actions of which merge into a series of front-level operations conducted according to a single overall conception and plan of the High Command and under its leadership. At the same time, it is essential to point out that the questions of preparing and conducting operations by groups of fronts prior to the Great Patriotic War were not fully worked out in military theory.

The development of the theory and practice of organizing and conducting a strategic operation by groups of fronts was brought about by the very course of the war. Nazi Germany initiated the war against the Soviet Union by an offensive on the main strategic sectors with large troop groupings supported by numerous aviation. Under these conditions, for repelling the surprise attack of superior enemy forces, the efforts of one front were not sufficient. It

required the pooling of efforts by several fronts fighting on the given strategic sector. The need arose to plan and carry out simultaneously several front-level operations linked together by a common overall concept under the leadership of the Supreme High Command. During the war years the Soviet Armed Forces prepared and brilliantly conducted a series of such operations. Among them a special place is held by the Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk Battles, the Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, Manchurian and other operations. As a total during the war years, over 50 operations by groups of fronts were carried out and a predominant majority of them was offensive ones. In terms of time these comprised more than 70 percent of the total length of military operations on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese Fronts.¹

Such operations were carried out, as a rule, by the forces of two or three fronts for achieving strategic goals (defeating the strategic enemy groupings and capturing strategically important areas (lines) and removing individual states of the enemy coalition from the war).

The rich experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that in the course of preparing for and conducting offensive strategic operations by groups of fronts, certain constant trends were established and a knowledge and profound analysis of these are not only of theoretical but also practical significance.

One of the most important trends in the development of strategic operations by groups of fronts during the years of the last war was the continuous rise in the decisiveness of the goals. The on-going growth of the combat might of the Soviet Army served primarily as the objective prerequisite for positing ever-more decisive goals. Due to the efforts of the Communist Party and the entire Soviet people, the material and technical capabilities of the nation continued to grow. This made it possible to accelerate the arming of the Armed forces with all types of combat equipment. The operational army continued to receive an ever-greater quantity of tanks, guns, mortars and aircraft (Table 1).

Table 1

Quantitative Indicators for the Growth of Combat Equipment
in the Operational Army*

Combat Equipment	Dec 1941	May 1942	Nov 1942	Jul 1943	Jan 1945
Tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount]	1,731	4,065	6,014	9,580	10,994
Guns	21,983	43,642	72,505	98,790	91,400
Aircraft	2,495**	3,164	3,088	8,293	14,570

* "Istoriya KPSS" [CPSU History], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 310-311.

** Just new types of aircraft.

All types of weapons and combat equipment were continuously improved. Already in 1943, the share of new models reached: 42.3 percent for firearms, 88 percent for artillery, more than 80 for armored tanks and 67 percent for aviation.²

The greater decisiveness of the goals for the strategic operations was also aided by the establishing of qualitatively new operational field forces of mobile troops, that is, the tank armies, and the availability for Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] of major strategic reserves where a decisive superiority in resources could be created by increasing the reserves in the sectors of the main thrusts. An important role was also played by the increased skill of the command personnel and the use of combat experience.

All of this made it possible for the Soviet Command in the course of the strategic operations by groups of fronts to decisively rout the large enemy troop groupings (Table 2), to capture strategically important areas and in the concluding period of the war to also knock individual nations of the Nazi coalition out of the war.

Table 2

Number of Defeated Enemy Divisions in Strategic Operations
by Groups of Fronts*

Operations	Number of enemy divisions		Percent of defeated enemy divisions in relation to number of divisions operating on Soviet-German Front
	Participating in operations**	Defeated in course of operations***	
Moscow (counteroffensive)	74	30	16
Stalingrad (counteroffensive)	65	49	18
Liberation of Right Bank Ukraine	135	76	31
Belorussia	114	76	32
Lwow-Sandomierz	60	40	16
Vistula-Oder	70	58	32
Berlin	116	100	55
Manchurian	44	44	100

* "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Military Art in World War II], Moscow, Izd. Voennoy Akademii General'nogo shtaba VS SSSR, 1973, p 200.

** In counting the divisions, two brigades were considered equal to one division.

*** The number of defeated divisions includes the destroyed, broken-up field forces as well as the divisions which suffered losses of more than 50 percent.

From the given table it can be seen that in the course of the Stalingrad Counteroffensive, 49 German divisions of Army Groups A, B and Don were defeated. In the strategic operations in the summer and autumn of 1944, the basic enemy groupings were defeated including the Army Groups North, Center, Northern Ukraine and Southern Ukraine. The satellites of Nazi Germany--Romania, Finland and Hungary--were knocked out of the war. As a result of the Vistula-Oder and East Pomeranian Operations, Poland was completely liberated. In the Berlin Operation, the Soviet troops defeated and took prisoner the basic forces of the Army Groups Vistula and Center (up to 100 divisions), they captured Berlin, they deprived Nazi Germany of the possibility of further organized resistance and forced it into unconditional surrender.

In the course of the Manchurian Offensive Operation, the more than 1 million-strong Kwantung Army was defeated, Northeast China and North Korea were liberated from the Japanese invaders. The last center of World War II was eliminated by the carrying out of this operation.

The importance of the designated trend for present-day conditions is determined by the fact that with the existing weapons, in the event of imperialist aggression against our nation and the socialist commonwealth countries, strategic operations will undoubtedly be carried out with even more decisive aims.

In line with the increased decisiveness of goals in the strategic operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, during the course of the war one could clearly see a trend for a constant increase in the number of men and weapons involved in conducting the strategic operations by groups of fronts. This was largely aided by the enormous mobilizational capabilities of the nation and by the increased output of weapons and combat equipment by industry. Just from October 1941 through December 1943, in accord with the decision of the State Defense Committee, more than 5.5 million persons were trained for the front.³ In terms of the amounts of average annual weapons production, the Soviet Union surpassed Germany as follows: by more than 2-fold for the output of field artillery pieces, by 5-fold for mortars and by 2.6-fold for antitank weapons.⁴ As a result, the Soviet Command had an opportunity to increase the strength of its attacks from operation to operation, using an ever-increasing amount of personnel, combat equipment and weapons. This is clearly shown from Table 3.

From the given data it can be seen that while in the first half of the war an offensive operation by a group of fronts ordinarily involved an average of 1 million men, 6,000-20,000 guns and mortars, 700-1,500 tanks and 1,100-2,100 combat aircraft, in the second half, for conducting a majority of operations 1.5-2.5 million men were involved, from 16,000 to 42,000 guns and mortars, from 2,000 to 7,000 tanks and SAU and 3,000-7,500 aircraft.

Under present-day conditions, when the economic capabilities of states have increased significantly, there is every reason to assume that the amount of involved men and weapons in strategic operations in a world war, should the imperialist states start it, will increase even more.

One of the trends in the strategic operations conducted in the course of the Great Patriotic War by groups of fronts was an increase in the spatial scope of combat operations. The depth of troop advance and their rate of advance increased particularly (Table 4).

Table 3

Amount of Men and Equipment Involved in Operations
by Groups of Fronts*

Operations	Number of Fronts	Number of Men	Number of Guns and Mortars	Number of Tanks and SAU	Number of Combat Aircraft
Moscow Counteroffensive	3	about 619,000 (718,800)	5,716**	721	1,170
Stalingrad Counteroffensive	3	1,106,000	15,500	1,463	1,350
Battle of Kursk***	5	1,336,000	over 19,000	3,444	2,172
Belorussian	4	1,400,000	31,000	5,200	over 5,000
Iasi-Kishinev	2	1,250,000	16,000	1,870	2,200
East Prussian	3	about 1,670,000	25,426	3,859	3,097
Vistula-Oder	2	2,200,000	33,500	7,000	5,000
Berlin	3	2,500,000	about 42,000	over 6,250	7,500
Manchurian	3	over 1,500,000	over 26,000	about 5,300	5,200

* See: "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1958, pp 370-374; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Voenizdat, Vol 7, 1979, p 518; Vol 4, 1977, p 537; Vol 8, 1980, p 675; Vol 2, 1976, pp 380, 147; Vol 1, 1976, pp 432, 457; Vol 5, 1978, p 129.

** Without 50-mm mortars.

*** Data for just Central and Voronezh Fronts.

As is seen from the Table [4], certain operations by groups of fronts in 1944 developed along a front of 500-1,000 km and the Manchurian Operation of 1945 had a front of 2,700 km. The depth of advance for the troops rose from 100-250 km (the Moscow Counteroffensive) to 600-800 km (Belorussian and Manchurian Operations). The average rate of advance for the troops increased from 6-10 km a day to 20-32 km and in individual periods of the Manchurian Operation it was over 80 km a day. As for the length of operations by groups of fronts, this continuously declined and in a majority of operations during the concluding period did not exceed 22-24 days.

Table 4

Basic Indicators for Major Offensive Operations
by Soviet Armed Forces*

Operations	Number of involved fronts, fleets and flotillas	Width of front of advance, km	Depth of operation, km	Average rate of advance, km/day	Duration of operation, days
Moscow Counteroffensive (1941-42)	3 fronts	1,000	100-250	6-9	33
Stalingrad Counteroffensive (1942-43)	3 fronts & flotilla	850	150-200	12-15	75
Belorussian (1944)	4 fronts & flotilla	1,100	550-600	15-20	68
Iasi-Kishinev (1944)	2 fronts, fleet & flotilla	500	over 300	30-32	10
Baltic (1944)	4 fronts & flotilla	over 1,000	300	5-12	71
Vistula-Oder (1945)	2 fronts	over 500	500	20-25	23
Berlin (1945)	3 fronts & flotilla	300	100-220	15-16	22
Manchurian (1945)	3 fronts, fleet & flotilla	2,700	600-800	33-82	24

* "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 12, p 284; "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne," pp 225-227.

The experience of the war has shown that the most important factors determining the scope of strategic operations was the content of their political and strategic goals, the economic capabilities of the nation, the strength and combat capabilities of the armed forces of the sides as well as the physico-geographic particular features of the theater of war.

Under present-day conditions, in addition to these factors, the scope of strategic operations can be decisively influenced by nuclear weapons. Their presence in the armed forces of the sides, their arming with modern conventional weapons and the high mobility of ground forces may cause the carrying out of operations of even greater scope.

It is essential to bear in mind that with the use of nuclear weapons the advancing troops can suffer great losses and this will necessitate a development of an offensive along individual axes and more frequently than usual to go over to the defensive on individual lines. This cannot help but be considered in the planning and conducting of strategic operations.

In the course of the war there was further development for the trend toward an increased role played by the fluid actions of troops and forces. This was a natural consequence of the development of weapons and primarily the result of the greatly increased fire power and mobility of the troops.

The experience of the war showed that high troop maneuverability and the capacity to rapidly concentrate efforts on the main sectors or in a short period of time to shift them to other sectors had a great and sometimes decisive impact on the outcome of operations. As a result of the skillful maneuvering of men and weapons, victory was achieved even with the absence of overall superiority over the enemy, as was the case, for example, during the operations at Moscow and Stalingrad.

In the course of operations by groups of fronts, the maneuvering of men and weapons was one of the decisive factors in the struggle to retain initiative. The realization of maneuvering made it possible to maintain the necessary supremacy over the enemy in the main sectors, to increase the force of the attacks, to conduct an offensive to a great depth and at a rapid pace and to successfully repel counterattacks by enemy troops. In a number of operations, maneuvering was carried out in the interests of shifting the basic efforts of the troops to a new axis, for successfully carrying out suddenly arising tasks, for outflanking previously prepared defensive areas and major centers of resistance and for making attacks in the flanks and rear of the defending enemy troops.

Many operations by fronts and groups of fronts can serve as examples of conducting broad maneuvering actions. Let us take up just certain of these. Thus, in the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation of 1944, in the aim of completing the defeat of the Army Group Northern Ukraine, for destroying arriving strategic reserves and capturing a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula, the 1st and 3d Guards Tank Armies were maneuvered from a region to the west of Lwow. The 5th Guards Army on this same sector was committed to battle from the second echelon of the First Ukrainian Front.

In the Kiev Operation of 1943, when as a result of the October offensive it had become clear that further actions from the Bukrin bridgehead had become ill-advised, upon instructions from Headquarters, the 3d Guards Tank Army, the VII Artillery Breakthrough Corps and the XXIII Rifle Corps in a relatively short period of time were regrouped to the Lyutezh bridgehead. The committing of them to battle ensured the defeat of the large enemy troop grouping and the successful conclusion of the operation.

An example of maneuvering for carrying out a newly arising major operational task could be the actions of the 3d Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation for making an attack in the rear of the Silesian enemy grouping and thwarting its plan to hold on to the Silesian industrial area. The turning of

this army to the south and the flanking attack along the eastern bank of the Oder River created a real threat of encirclement for the Nazi troops in Silesia and forced the start of their pullback from under the attacks by troops advancing from the front.

The maneuvering of strategic reserves in the aim of supporting the flanks of the assault groupings making the main thrust was carried out by organizing an offensive on adjacent sectors. This was the case in the winter of 1944, when a new Second Belorussian Front was deployed between the First Ukrainian and First Belorussian Fronts; this new front on the axis of Kovel, Brest supported the actions of the main grouping on the Right Bank Ukraine against possible enemy attacks from the north.

The maneuvering of the reserves of Hq SHC was widely and successfully employed to increase the effort for the purpose of developing an offensive in the sector of the main thrust. In the spring of 1944, for example, in the course of an offensive on the Right Bank Ukraine, Hq SHC, in maneuvering the 4th Tank Army, reinforced the First Ukrainian Front. This made it possible to create a powerful tank grouping consisting of the 3d Guards and 4th Tank Armies for exploiting the success in the operational depth of the enemy defenses in conducting the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation. In the course of the 1945 winter campaign, for this same purpose, upon a decision of Hq SHC, seven all-arms armies and one air army were additionally shifted to the Berlin axis and this ensured the creation of a powerful assault grouping of enemy troops and a significant superiority in men and weapons over the enemy.

In the increased maneuverability of combat operations in the course of the last war, we should particularly note the role of the highly mobile field forces and formations, that is, the tank armies and the tank and mechanized corps. These were employed to defeat the operational enemy reserves, to deprive it of the possibility of maneuvering men and weapons, to capture, without a halt, bridgeheads and important operational-strategic lines and objects, for coming out on the rear lines of communications and escape routes of the enemy groupings, for disrupting the control systems, for upsetting the work of the rear services and transport and for carrying out other tasks. Along with the maneuvering of the troops (forces), the importance of the maneuvering of fire and air strikes increased continuously.

It must be expected that in the operations of a future war, when combat operations will develop over enormous expanses and there will not be solid fronts, maneuverability along with increased fire power will be a determining condition for achieving victory over the enemy.

The article has examined just certain, in our view, basic trends in the development of the theory and practice of offensive operations by groups of fronts in the Great Patriotic War. A further improvement in weapons and the organizational structure of the troops will inevitably cause changes in the forms and methods of conducting military operations and, consequently, will necessitate the rise of new trends in developing the theory and practice of modern strategic operations in a theater of war. A prompt elucidation of these trends is one of the most important tasks for Soviet military science.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1983, pp 287, 281.

² Ibid., p 160.

³ "Istoriya KPSS" [CPSU History], Vol 5, Book 1, p 311.

⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 12, p 168.

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WORLD WAR II: TACTICS IN CROSSING ANTITANK DEFENSES TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 23-28

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Col A. Tsynkalov: "Crossing Enemy Antitank Defenses from the Experience of the Second and Third Periods of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] In the course of the Great Patriotic War, in line with the on-going increase in the number of tanks employed by the belligerents, antitank defenses continued to be improved. There was a gradual increase in the quantity and quality of antitank weapons, the methods of their combat employment were improved and the depth of echeloning increased. All of this led to significant losses of tanks for the advancing troops and hence required careful organization of the neutralization and skilled crossing of enemy antitank defenses.

The system of antitank defenses of the Nazi troops during the second and third periods of the war ordinarily included: firing of field and antitank artillery, tanks and assault guns located in the antitank strongpoints and areas; groups of tank hunters equipped with close-combat antitank weapons (bazookas, "Panzer-schreck" antitank rocket launchers, "Puphen" antitank mortars and so forth); mobile antitank reserves including chiefly tanks and assault guns as well as man-made explosive and non-explosive obstacles. On the most important sectors, antitank defenses were organized to the entire depth of the tactical defensive zone. Here the basic mass of antitank weapons, as a rule, was in the main zone.

The first echelon divisions defending the main defensive zone, with the employment of the assigned reinforcements, in a majority of instances created rather high densities of antitank weapons. For example, in the East Prussian Operation, the enemy 299th, 129th and 292d Infantry Divisions occupied defenses along a front of 40 km. Each was reinforced by a brigade of assault guns and an artillery regiment of the High Command Reserve. This made it possible for them to create a density of 22 artillery guns and 60 close-combat antitank weapons per kilometer of front.¹ In the main defensive zone to a depth of up to 2 km, the enemy ordinarily positioned around 60 percent of the antitank weapons, up to 25 percent at a depth up to 5 km and up to 15 percent at a depth up to 8 km.² The minelaying density for likely tank approaches reached 2,000-2,500 antitank mines per kilometer of front. Minefields were created both in front of the forward edge as well as deep in the main defensive zone.³ To the entire depth of the configuration of the enemy's operational defenses the

densities of the antitank weapons were significantly higher and reached, for example, in the Berlin Operation 17 tanks and assault guns, 60 guns,⁴ up to 200 units of close-combat antitank weapons⁵ per kilometer of front.

The crossing of such enemy antitank defenses, as combat experience showed, required the conducting of continuous reconnaissance of the antitank weapons; the dependable neutralizing of them by the fire of artillery, tanks, SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] and the infantry and by air strikes in close cooperation with these weapons; skillful maneuvering of the tanks on the battlefield; the prompt constructing of passages for the tanks and SAU in the enemy antitank obstacles in front of the forward edge and deep in the defenses; the broad use of smokescreens for camouflaging the tanks and blinding the enemy antitank weapons.

Reconnoitering of the enemy defenses, including the antitank weapons was carried out continuously by all branches of troops. In preparing the operations, its basic efforts were directed at assembling data on the grouping and disposition of the weapons, particularly the tanks, the self-propelled and antitank artillery in the enemy main defensive zone in the aim of dependable fire damage during the course of the artillery and air offensive. During this period particularly important significance was assumed by air reconnaissance. It acquired an average of up to 85 percent of the data on the enemy antitank defenses.⁶

Reconnaissance in force played a major role in the final reconnaissance of the enemy antitank weapons, particularly in the first position. For example, in breaking through the defenses of the Nazi troops by the VIII Rifle Corps in the Orel Operation (July 1943), the forward battalions of the 11th Guards and 83d Rifle Divisions, in conducting reconnaissance in force, ensured the disclosure of the entire fire plan of the enemy defenses.⁷

The commanders of the tank units and formations during the period of preparing for the operation received intelligence information from the superior staffs, from the aviation and rifle formations in direct contact with the enemy and also organized a system of their own observation posts. From the intelligence data and the aerial photographs deep in the tactical defensive zone schemes were drawn up for the positioning of the antitank weapons and obstacles and these were later studied by the tank troops in the sector of the forthcoming operations. With the start of the attack, the reconnaissance of the antitank weapons was conducted in force by the subunits, by the reconnaissance groups and fighting and reconnaissance patrols as well as by the mobile artillery observation posts which usually were in the battle formations of the attacking troops.

Reconnaissance aviation in the course of the offensive, along with carrying out other missions, determined the lines on which the enemy had organized the defenses and detected the bringing up of enemy tank and antitank reserves (particularly in the flanks of advancing units).

In preparing for an offensive and in the course of combat operations, the basic efforts of engineer reconnaissance in the interests of the advancing tanks were directed at the prompt detection of the mixed minefields and other enemy antitank obstacles. The successful crossing of the enemy antitank defenses by

the advancing troops was ensured primarily by their secure neutralization by all types of fire.

During the period of the artillery softening up for the attack, the artillery, along with carrying out other missions, hit the antitank weapons with massed intense shelling of the antitank strongpoints and areas and destroyed and neutralized the individual antitank weapons by methodical fire; the antitank weapons located on the forward edge were hit by guns set for direct laying. The degree of hitting the enemy antitank weapons depended upon the quantity and quality of the artillery used for carrying out this task and the skillful allocating of its fire. During the major operations of the third period of the war, the improved qualitative composition of the involved artillery (30-40 percent of the guns had a caliber of over 100 mm) made it possible during the period of the artillery softening up for the attack, to hit an average of 50-60 percent of the weapons located in the main defensive zone. Only individual objects were neutralized in the second zone.⁸

The aviation neutralized the enemy antitank defenses by making massed bombing and strafing raids against the antitank strongpoints and areas, against the tank and antitank enemy reserves as well as by operations of small groups of ground attack planes against individual targets. Here during the period of the artillery softening up of the attack, aviation made strikes against enemy antitank weapons and tanks predominantly on the flanks of the breakthrough sector deep in the main defensive zone and in the second defensive zone.

With the start of the attack, the advancing tanks were exposed to moving artillery barrage fire. From a distance of 1,000 m from the forward edge, specially assigned enemy guns and tanks from temporary firing positions began firing against our tanks. At 200-300 m ahead of the antitank obstacles covering the forward edge, the artillery shifted fire to the infantry in the aim of cutting it off from the advancing tanks with the fire of all antitank weapons located in the first position being concentrated against the tanks.⁹ For this reason, during the period of attack it was important to exclude a gap between the artillery softening up and the artillery support of the attack. This was achieved by intense shelling of the enemy artillery firing positions; this overlapped the end of the artillery softening up and the time the tanks reached the forward edge of the enemy defenses; by designating the first line for supporting the attack from the forward defensive edge; by shifting the fire of a portion of the artillery to the first artillery support line some 2 or 3 minutes before the end of the artillery softening up. Finally, the same purpose was followed by the firing of the direct laying guns with this being carried out against the forward edge of the enemy defenses, after the basic mass of the artillery had shifted fire to the first artillery support line.

Artillery support for the attack of tanks and infantry during the second period of the war was most often provided by a single rolling barrage and in the third period by a double one. Precisely such a method of supporting the attack contributed most to successfully hitting the antitank weapons and crossing the enemy antitank defenses to the depth of its first position.

In the main sectors, the advance of the tanks and infantry was supported by massed and concentrated strikes by bomber and particularly ground attack

aviation. In the second period of the war, the aviation attacked the antitank weapons and other enemy weapons usually upon call. In the third period, the bombers as before operated upon call while the ground attack planes provided support within the entire main defensive zone by the direct escort method. Groups of 8-12 ground attack planes successively relieved one another, they remained continuously over the battlefield and neutralized the enemy artillery, tanks, centers of resistance and reserves.¹⁰ Here the targets and objectives of the attacks for each wave of airplanes were successively shifted deep into the enemy defenses and this created a sort of rolling barrage a distance of 500-600 m in front of the attacking tanks, this increased the degree of neutralizing the enemy antitank defenses and facilitated their crossing.

The successful crossing of the antitank defenses was significantly aided by the close cooperation of the close support tanks and the infantry. In breaking through the enemy defenses, the close support tanks usually operated ahead of the infantry, staying more than 200-400 m away and supporting it with continuous fire cooperation. The basic task of the tanks was to destroy the enemy infantry and its weapons. The advancing infantry, in cooperating with the tanks, destroyed the close combat antitank weapons with its fire and the crews of antitank guns, helping the tanks cross the antitank obstacles. On covered terrain and with tank-impassable areas, particularly minefields, the infantry, reinforced by combat engineers, usually operated ahead of the tanks, covering them from the enemy close-combat antitank weapons.

With the going over of the artillery support for the attack to artillery accompaniment, there was a weakening of the fire effect on the enemy antitank defenses by the artillery from covered firing positions. From the combat experience of the second and third periods of the war, continuous fire accompaniment of the close support tanks under these conditions was achieved by including them self-propelled artillery and heavy tanks and forming up the battle order of the close support tanks in two or three echelons. Often the close support tank groups were reinforced with heavy tanks or heavy SAU and in many operations of 1944-1945 these comprised 30-40 percent of the total number of the close support tanks and sometimes even more.

The second echelon of tanks was employed to exploit and reinforce the success of the first echelon or for reinforcing it. It had the mission of destroying antitank weapons by firing in the spaces between the first echelon tanks in advancing some 200-400 m behind them.

With the including of self-propelled artillery as part of the close support tank groups, the artillery operated, as a rule, in the infantry battle formations and provided fire for the first echelon tanks. The second echelon of close support tanks in this instance advanced behind the infantry battle formations at a distance up to 200 m and was often used for repelling enemy counterattacks.

The tank and mechanized corps were basically employed for completing the breakthrough of the first (main) enemy defensive zone at a rapid pace. The tank armies with the forward brigades and sometime with the deployment of the main forces were committed to battle most often for breaking through the second defensive zone without a halt. The mobile groups involved in breaking through

defensive lines overcame the antitank defenses together with the infantry, artillery and with air support. The fire damage to the enemy antitank weapons ahead of the commitment line and on the flanks of the breakthrough sector was carried out in the course of the artillery and air support for their commitment. Here the artillery neutralized the near enemy antitank defenses. Subsequently, firing was carried out predominantly upon the call of the formation commanders or the artillery spotters which were in the battle formations of the forward brigades.

The aviation had the greatest impact on the enemy antitank defenses, its reserves and counterattacking groupings during the first hours of the operations of mobile groups after their commitment. The antitank weapons of the defenders surviving after the air and artillery strikes were destroyed by the firing of the tanks, SAU, the accompaniment artillery and the motorized infantry from the forward detachments of the mobile groups.

With the reaching of the operational depth by the mobile groups and their distancing from the main forces of the fronts and armies, the successful crossing of enemy antitank defenses on the intermediate defensive lines depended largely upon their saturation with TOE and attached artillery, primarily self-propelled and upon the number of supporting aviation.

The crossing of the enemy intermediate defensive lines by the mobile groups was ordinarily carried out without a halt. In the aim of achieving surprise, this was commenced first by the forward detachments without artillery softening up and with powerful air support. The intermediate line on the Mala Panew River was crossed in this manner by the 3d Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation.¹¹

If it was impossible to cross an intermediate defensive line without a halt, its breakthrough was prepared for in a short time. For example, the 2d Tank Army in the Lublin-Brest Operation was unable to cross the enemy defenses without a halt on the line of Kalushin, Sennitsa, Kolbel, Karchev. Ten hours were spent on preparing to break through, including around 4 hours of daylight. The attack in the breakthrough sectors started after a 5-minute artillery intensive shelling and attacks by ground attack planes against the enemy antitank weapons. The massing of the tanks and SAU in the breakthrough sectors of the corps and the use of their fire and broad maneuvering made it possible in several hours to cross the enemy defenses on this line.¹²

In crossing the enemy antitank defenses, the questions of combating the close-combat antitank weapons which caused significant damage to the tanks assumed an important place. For example, in the II Mechanized Corps of the 2d Guards Tank Army in the East Pomeranian Operation, 60 percent of all the hit tanks were hit by bazookas.¹³ For this reason additional measures were required to support tank operations. In particular, there was careful reconnaissance of their routes of advance. The groups of tank hunters were destroyed chiefly by infantry fire and here each tank was escorted by sub-machine gunners (tank-mounted infantry).

Engineer support for crossing the antitank obstacles held an important place in the successful crossing of the enemy antitank defenses. This consisted in

detecting them, making passages through them and routing the tanks and SAU across them. The passages through the minefields ahead of the forward edge of the enemy defenses were made by various methods: by combat engineers manually 1 or 2 days prior to the start of the offensive, by blowing up the minefield using bangalore torpedoes and concentrated charges, by artillery and mortar fire during the period of artillery softening up and also by minesweeping tanks. The latter began to be most widely used in the third period of the war. Their employment was caused by the solid mining of the entire defensive front by the enemy, by the extensive use of mixed minefields in depth as well as by the desire to reduce the influence of the minefields on the rate of advance of the tanks and the tank losses from the mines.

Smokescreen support for the advancing troops played an important role in the successful crossing of antitank defenses. The broad use of blinding smoke-screens not only reduced the effectiveness of enemy antitank fire by 10-15-fold but also upset the entire enemy fire plan and observation and checked the maneuvering of the tank and antitank reserves. Smokescreens were also widely employed for covering the advance of the tanks and SAU to the forward edge and concealing the maneuvering of tank subunits in outflanking the antitank strong-points. With the committing of mobile groups to a breakthrough (engagement), camouflaging smokescreens were set on the flanks of the commitment zones to the entire depth of the tactical enemy defensive zone and this reduced the effectiveness of enemy flanking fire against the tank columns.

Thus, the combat experience of the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War showed that for successfully crossing the enemy antitank defenses it was essential to securely neutralize all the enemy antitank weapons to a significant depth. Ever-greater significance was assumed by the maneuvering of the tanks and the SAU on the battlefield, by continuous tactical and fire support between the elements of the battle formation and the various weapons, by engineer support for the crossing of antitank obstacles and by the wide employment of smokescreens for concealing the maneuvering of the subunits and blinding the enemy antitank weapons.

Under present-day conditions, the duel of tanks and antitank weapons has become significantly more acute. In line with this new problems have arisen over the questions of organizing the crossing of antitank defenses by advancing troops. A profound study and creative employment of the rich combat experience of the Great Patriotic War can provide significant aid in successfully solving them.

FOOTNOTES

¹ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 332, inv. 4950, file 34, sheets 152-153.

² Ibid., folio 38, inv. 259481, file 28, sheets 45-48.

³ "Razvitiye taktiki Sovetskoy Armii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Development of Soviet Army Tactics in the Years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voenizdat, 1958, p 191.

- ⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 10, Voenizdat, 1979, p 312.
- ⁵ TsAMO, folio 299, inv. 48826, file 2, sheet 297.
- ⁶ "Boyevoy opyt artillerii" [Artillery Combat Experience], Voenizdat, 1946, p 100.
- ⁷ TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2511, file 2635, sheets 4, 5.
- ⁸ Ibid., folio 38, inv. 80046, file 114, sheet 168.
- ⁹ Ibid., inv. 2222, file 232, sheets 1-16.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., folio 327, inv. 4190, file 111, sheets 55-57.
- ¹¹ Ibid., folio 315, inv. 4440, file 191, sheet 32.
- ¹² Ibid., folio 307, inv. 4156, file 26, sheets 442-470.
- ¹³ Ibid., inv. 4148, file 308, sheet 306.

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WORLD WAR II: IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS IN AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS

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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Capt 1st Rank Ye. Dvoryanov and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col V. Zaytsev: "Certain Questions of Command and Communications in the Landing of Amphibious Forces"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces acquired great experience in the landing of amphibious forces. In the course of defensive and offensive operations on maritime sectors, 113 operational and tactical parties (over 250,000 men with equipment and weapons) were landed.¹ More than 80 percent of all the landed forces successfully carried out the set missions.² An important factor ensuring their success was the continuous improvement in the control of the troops and naval forces.

During the first period of the war, when the Soviet Army was conducting an active defense, around 40 amphibious forces were landed including the major landing operation, the Kerch-Feodosiya. Its plan was to surround and destroy the enemy grouping on the Kerch Peninsula by the simultaneous landing of troops from the 51st and 44th All-Arms Armies in the area of Kerch and Feodosiya. Subsequently the offensive was to be developed, the troops of the Sevastopol Defensive Area were to be relieved and the Crimea liberated.

Hq SHC entrusted the leadership of the operation to the commander of the Transcaucasus Front, Lt Gen D. T. Kozlov.³ The landing of the troops was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet and to the Azov Naval Flotilla which was part of the fleet; during the period of the operation these naval units were subordinate to the commander of the front.

On the basis of the directive from the commander of the front of 13 December 1941, preparations were started for the operation. Participating in the planning of the operation were the staffs of the front, the fleet, the 44th and 51st Armies, the Azov Flotilla, the Kerch and Novorossiysk naval bases.⁴ A week prior to the start of the operation, a conference was held which examined the questions of organizing communications. In the aim of centralizing leadership of communications, both in the preparations for and in the course of the operation, a decision was taken to entrust the elaboration of the communications plan to the fleet staff.⁵

The landing of the force on the northeastern shore of the Kerch Peninsula started on 26 December 1941 and at Feodosiya on 29 December. By the end of 2 January 1942, the troops of the front had advanced 100-110 km and cleared the enemy out of the Kerch Peninsula. The operation ended with the capturing of an important operational beachhead in the Crimea on which the troops of the Crimean Front were deployed.

The success of the operation was ensured by a number of factors. These were: the previously planned and carefully organized cooperation of the Army and Navy forces, the skillful planning and surprise in the landing of the troops. The importance of firm, flexible and continuous control of the forces was reaffirmed.

At the same time, in the process of preparation and then in the course of the operation, there were substantial shortcomings in the organizing of control. For example there was not sufficient coordination in the individual particular plans. The commander of the operation was in Tbilisi, while his operations group was at Krymskaya camp, that is, more than 100 km from the basic landing points. The command posts of the 51st Army and the Azov Flotilla were located in Temryuk and that of the Kerch Naval Base in Taman.⁶ For a protracted time communications was lost with the amphibious detachment "B." The landing troops and landing equipment did not have a sufficient amount of communications equipment. All these shortcomings were explained by the lack of necessary experience in landing operational forces, by the great shortage of landing equipment and the short time for preparing the operation.

The questions of controlling the forces in the Kerch-Feodosiya Operation as well as in the landing of tactical amphibious forces in the first period of the war were carefully analyzed and generalized in a special directive of the People's Commissar of the Navy (July 1942) and were discussed at a meeting of the leadership of the fleets of November of the same year.⁷

Of exceptionally important significance for improving the control of the men and equipment in the landing operations were the Instructions on the Organization of Communications between the Red Army Troops and Ships, Naval Formations and Units issued by the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy at the end of 1942 and the Regulations Governing Joint Operations of Ground Forces with the Navy and Naval River Flotillas worked out by the General Staff in 1943. These guiding documents clearly set forward the basic provisions on command in all stages of a landing operation. In them, a significant place was given to the organizing of communications as the weakest link in the system of control and command among the cooperating branches of troops and naval forces in the course of combat operations. The instructions on organizing communications envisaged the elaboration of a communications plan for the stages of the operation considering the particular features of sea and land communications. Here the basic type of communications was to be radio. It was recommended that predominantly radio links be established and only in rare instances would there be radio networks. Provision was also made for traffic between the cooperating staffs by liaison officers who should be provided with means of transport and radios. These documents played a positive role in further improving control of the troops and naval forces in the landing operations.

In the second period of the war, the landing of amphibious forces began to be more closely coordinated with the advance of troops on the maritime sectors.

In preparing for the Novorossiysk and Kerch-Eltigen Operations and in coordinating the actions of the troops of the front and the fleet forces, a particular role began to be played by the operations group of the Chief Naval Staff formed under the staff of the Northern Caucasus Front. This group was entrusted with preparing proposals on using the naval forces and the providing of information.

In the landing operations of the second period of the war, control over the troops and naval forces was significantly centralized. All landing operations were carried out under the leadership of the commander of a front and this made it possible to control the resources in all stages more concretely, flexibly and efficiently. The commander of the front, Gen I. Ya. Petrov, for example, was directly in charge of preparing the landing force in the Novorossiysk Landing Operation, he personally instructed the commanders and heard the reports on the readiness of the forces. When the Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation was being prepared, he along with the representative of Hq SHC, Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko and the commander of the 18th Army, Gen K. N. Leselidze, paid a visit to the ships, the units and subunits of the army assigned for the landing. In the course of the operation, the commander of the front, considering the situation, adjusted the tasks of the naval forces and in the necessary instances reassigned them.

Thus, in the landing operations of the second period of the war, the commander of the front made better use of the fleet in the interests of carrying out the main tasks. In 1943, positive experience was obtained in creating for the period of the operation special control bodies in the form of the staffs of the fleet operational formations (the staffs of the landing forces, the cover detachment, the ship fire support detachment and so forth). As a rule, these included: the chief of staff of the fleet formation, the chief of the operations department, the flagship specialists for communications, navigators, artillery representatives and a representative of the rear services.⁸ These staffs were manned by officers having experience in preparing and conducting landing operations or who had undergone special training.

In the aim of clearly defining the relationships between the commander of the landing and the commander of the landing force, the staff of the commander of the landing operation usually worked out special instructions which determined the subordination of the landing commander to the commander of the landing forces, the procedure for landing the amphibious troops and so forth. They indicated that "the command of the landed troops until the establishing of dependable communications between them and the army staff remains with the commander of the landing forces."⁹ The presence of such instructions and the precise fulfillment of their provisions by the officials helped to improve cooperation among the different forces.

More time began to be allocated for organizing the operation and this made it possible to have detailed planning and more careful preparation of the troops and naval forces. A directive of a front was the document on the basis of which the landing operation was conducted. Along with setting the missions for the

troops, this defined the tasks for the fleet, it set the time and place for embarking and landing, the times allocated for training and so forth.¹⁰ On the basis of this directive, the commander of the fleet in his own order defined the cover and security forces, the naval fire support, the composition of the transport and landing equipment, the air group, the landing sections and bases and so forth.

In the amphibious operations of 1943, the bringing of them closer to the landing area was an important trend in creating and locating the command posts. The men and equipment in the operation were controlled from a command post and when necessary auxiliary control posts were established. Here the control posts of the commanders of the front and the naval forces were usually located in direct proximity to one another. This provided an opportunity to them to more effectively settle the questions of directing the men and equipment and to quickly restore disrupted cooperation, as was the case in the Novorossiysk Operation in the autumn of 1943.¹¹ In this same operation, a network of observation posts located on the coast was established for organizing visual observation over the movement of the vessels from the troop embarkation points to their landing.

In the aim of ensuring the dependable communications in preparing the landing operations, it was a practice to work out "Communications Instructions" and these would establish the organization of communications for all the forces participating in the operation and also provided instructions for the flagship signals officer from the staff of the landing forces on using the means of communications with the ships and the landing force and for the signals chief of the fleet air forces on organizing communications between the aircraft, the airfields and the ships. The staffs of the landing forces, the ship fire support detachments and the cover forces worked out their own documents for organizing communications in accord with the orders of their commanders.

Radio contact between the commander of the fleet and the commander of the landing forces and the commander of the ship fire support detachment was organized, as a rule, over separate radio links. From the moment of the landing of the forward detachments of the assault force, radio contact was also established with the landing troops. The signal troops landed on the shore established contact with the approaching landing craft, with the commander of the landing forces and the fleet communications center. Upon the end of the landing, radio contact with the assault force was maintained by the staff of the front (army) and the fleet.

In the second period of the war, cooperation between the troops of the front and the naval forces was significantly improved. For example, in the Novorossiysk Operation, from the artillery units of the 18th Army and the shore artillery of the Novorossiysk Naval Base, an assault support artillery group was organized and this was divided into three subgroups according to the number of landing points. The assault support artillery group was directed by the artillery commander of the 18th Army. The proximity of the army and navy command posts facilitated the organizing of cooperation and contributed significantly to the successful carrying out of the artillery support tasks, particularly in the fight to land the first waves of the party.

During the third period of the Great Patriotic War and in the campaign in the Far East, the practice of landing amphibious forces underwent further development. In 1944-1945, the Soviet Armed Forces made 63 amphibious landings, including the Tuloksa, Moonsund and Kuril Landing Operations. The development of a rapid offensive by the Soviet forces on the maritime sectors necessitated the preparation of their landing in a relatively short time. For example, just 2 days were allocated to prepare the Tuloksa Landing Operation.¹³ The liberation of the Moonsund Islands, for example, started in the course of the Tallinn Operation, when the troops of the Leningrad Front reached the coast of the Moonsund Strait and without a halt captured Virtsu Island (26 September) and Vormsi Island (27 September). The developing situation and the geographic features also caused a unique organization of leadership. Overall leadership over the landing operation was provided by the commander of the Leningrad Front, Mar SU L. A. Govorov. The land forces of the amphibious party was under the command of the commander of the 8th Army, Gen R. N. Starikov, while the landing forces were under the command of the chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet Squadron, Rear Adm I. G. Svyatov.¹⁴

In control and command an increased role was played by the staffs of the temporary operational formations of naval forces set up for the landing of amphibious troops. These were organized from the permanent staffs of the fleet, the flotillas, the naval bases, the naval defensive areas under the commander of the landing forces, the commander of the cover forces, the commander of the ship fire support detachment and the commanders of the landing detachments.

The commander of the landing forces and the commander of the amphibious party usually were on the same ship. This made it possible to effectively control different forces in the battle for the landing. With operations inside skerries, the command post of the commander of the landing forces sometimes was located on one of the islands from which he observed and controlled the battle for the landing.

The methods of organizing and maintaining continuous cooperation underwent further development in the amphibious landings in the third period of the war. These were carefully worked out in special exercises, games and training conducted in the troops and on the fleets long before the start of the actual landing. Thus, in the winter of 1944, the Baltic Fleet conducted a major game "An Operation to Capture the Islands of the Moonsund Archipelago."¹⁵ One of the training sessions for the landing troops, the landing equipment and support ships assigned to carry out the Tuloksa Landing Operation developed into an actual landing of an assault party.¹⁶ In training the landing parties in the campaign in the Far East, of important significance was the exercise conducted in April 1945 in the Pacific Fleet on the subject "The Landing of a Major Assault Force and Fire Assistance to the Flank of a Maritime Army."

In organizing cooperation among the naval forces and troops of the front in the Baltic, a major role was played by the naval section set up on the staff of the Leningrad Front in accord with the decision of Hq SHC. It was directly under the chief of staff of the front, and in the planning and preparation of the operations was the connecting link between the staffs of the fleet and the front.

A characteristic feature of the amphibious landing operations of 1944-1945 was the closer cooperation between the naval aviation and the frontal [tactical] aviation. Its organizers were the commanders of the fleet air forces and the air army and they coordinated the efforts of aviation in terms of the place, time and tasks in accord with the decision of the front (fleet) commander directing the landing operation. Cooperation was shown in the operations plan and the cooperation planning table and the latter was worked out in detail according to the stages of landing operations.

In certain landing operations there was a tendency to reduce the number of operations documents worked out by the staffs. Thus, in preparing the Tuloksa Operation, instead of the plans for the artillery and air support of the assault force, a single "Plan of the Artillery-Air Offensive" was worked out. This was elaborated with the participation of the flagship gunnery officer from the Ladoga Flotilla, the artillery commander of the 70th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, the signals officer of the 7th Air Army, the operations officer from the Baltic Fleet Air Forces and a representative from the operations section of the Baltic Fleet Staff. Moreover, the plan was coordinated with the flagship gunnery officer from the staff of the landing forces and the chief of staff of the ship fire support detachment. In drawing up the plan, all questions were settled related to the use of aviation, artillery, the ship fire support detachment and the spotter posts.¹⁷ In preparing for the same operation, a detailed planning table was worked out for coordinating all the participating forces.

Great attention was given to organizing radio communications between the cooperating forces and branches of troops both on the operational and tactical levels. On the operational level this was provided over the cooperation radio networks, including here the staffs of the rifle formations as well as the staff of the amphibious force and the fire support ships.

As a whole, the system of controlling the troops and naval forces in the amphibious landing operations was continuously improved during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Centralized leadership was strengthened over all the diverse forces of the ground troops and navy participating in an operation by the all-arms command, that is, the commander of the front. A greater role was played by the special operational-tactical control bodies for the diverse forces and these were set up as temporary operational formations for conducting the landing operations. A diverse system of control posts was developed and improved. A unified communications system was established for all the forces involved in the landing operation.

Cooperation was improved among all the diverse forces involved in the operation. For its organization and realization in the course of the operation, it was necessary to have careful preparation of the command and the staffs, the joint planning of actions and a clear understanding of the set missions, the capabilities of the men and equipment, the role and specific features in the actions of each branch of troops and Armed Service as well as a unity of views among the command on the methods of carrying out the set tasks.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ S. G. Gorshkov, "Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva" [The Sea Power of a State], Voenizdat, 1976, pp 239-240.
- ² "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirivoy voyne" [Military Art in World War II], Moscow, Izd. Voennoy akademii General'nogo shtaba, 1973, p 457.
- ³ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 4, Voenizdat, 1975, p 295.
- ⁴ TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 10, file 1775, sheet 10.
- ⁵ Ibid., folio 2, inv. 1, file 809, sheet 50.
- ⁶ G. I. Vaneyev, "Chernomortsy v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [The Black Sea Sailors in the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1978, p 117.
- ⁷ TsVMA, folio 79, file 12327, sheets 373-375.
- ⁸ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 224, inv. 932, file 206, sheet 177.
- ⁹ TsVMA, folio 3, file 33099, sheets 78-79.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., folio 1087, inv. 5, file 96, sheet 63.
- ¹¹ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1977, p 12.
- ¹² TsAMO, folio 224, inv. 932, sheet 14.
- ¹³ TsVMA, folio 13, file 13198, sheet 32; folio 2, inv. 1, file 1006, sheet 3.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., folio 9, file 13578, sheet 21.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., folio 161, inv. 6, file 105, sheet 82.
- ¹⁶ TsAMO, folio 214, inv. 1437, file 15176, sheet 23.
- ¹⁷ TsVMA, folio 13, file 13198, sheet 32.

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ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS ON DNEPR BATTLE RELEASED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 35-39

[Archival Documents prepared by Col I. Yaroshenko and Lt Col V. Kovalev: "The Battle for the Dnepr in Documents"]

[Text] Having won a brilliant victory in the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet troops initiated a powerful offensive toward the Dnepr, where in the autumn of 1943, the center of events shifted on the Soviet-German Front. The Nazi Command, after the collapse of Operation Citadel, decided to go over to the defensive along the entire front and begin building a strategic defensive line the basis of which was the defenses along the Dnepr.

The ruling clique of Nazi Germany initiated a noisy propaganda campaign in the course of which they proclaimed the unattainability of the Dnepr line. But nothing could halt the powerful thrust of the Soviet troops.

Even in the course of the Kursk Battle in mid-August 1943, Hq SHC had aimed the troops of the Central Front toward Nezhin and Kiev, those of the Voronezh Front toward Poltava and Kremenchug, those of the Steppe Front toward Krasnograd and Verkhni-Dneprovsk and those of the Southwestern Front toward Pavlograd and Zaporozhye.

One of the major tasks of the Soviet Army was to thwart the enemy's plan of an organized withdrawal of its troops behind the Dnepr and to capture crossings over the river.

In the heavy battles for the liberation of the Left Bank Ukraine, during the crossing of the Dnepr and in the struggle to establish bridgeheads on its right bank, the Soviet soldiers showed examples of unbending courage and valor. Their heroic feats were recognized by the motherland with high decorations. Just for the crossing of the Dnepr and the capturing of bridgeheads on its western bank, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 2,438 soldiers, including 47 generals, 1,123 officers and 1,268 enlisted men.¹

Document 1

DIRECTIVE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1943
TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE CENTRAL, VORONEZH, STEPPE AND SOUTHWESTERN FRONTS ²

Comrade Ivanov³ has ordered that when the armies reach the Dnepr River they immediately cross it on a broad front in the aim of scattering the enemy's attention and forces.

The antiaircraft weapons are to move up to the crossings for securely protecting them against enemy air strikes.

Reports on the measures taken are to be submitted.

Antonov

(TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 3, inv. 11556, file 13, sheet 323).

Document 2

DIRECTIVE OF Hq SHC OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1943
TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE CENTRAL, VORONEZH, STEPPE AND SOUTHWESTERN FRONTS ⁴

Hq SHC orders:

1. In the immediate future to eliminate all bridgeheads in enemy hands on the left bank of the Dnepr River.

The commander of the Southwestern Front is to first clear the Zaporozhye bridgehead of the enemy.

Bear in mind that until the left bank of the Dnepr is cleared of the enemy, the Germans, using the bridgeheads occupied by them, will have an opportunity to attack the flank and rear of our troops both on the left bank of the Dnepr and those crossing over to its right bank.

2. The antiaircraft weapons are to be immediately brought up to the crossings and securely defend both the battle formations of the crossing troops as well as the crossings themselves against enemy air strikes, regardless of the number of troops which have crossed.

Hq SHC
I. Stalin
Antonov

(TsAMO, folio 3, inv. 11556, file 13, sheet 329).

Document 3

BATTLE ORDER FROM COMMANDER OF CENTRAL FRONT OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1943
TO COMMANDER OF 60th ARMY ⁵

1. The broken enemy units by stubborn defense are endeavoring to prevent the crossing of our troops over the Desna and Dnepr Rivers and halt their further advance to the west.
2. The 60th Army, in securing its left flank against enemy counterattacks from the south and southwest and in directing the main efforts on its right flank, is to continue a rapid advance with the mission of crossing the Desna and Dnepr Rivers and by the end of 26 September 1943 with the main forces of the army to capture a line: Gubin (4 km to the north of Gornostaypol), Dityatki, Lobydva, Vakhovka, Katyuzhanka, Abramovka, Gavrilovka, Novo-Petrovtsy (18 km to the northwest of Kiev). In carrying out this mission, the army units to the south of the left boundary line are not to move up.
3. On the right the 13th Army is to cross the Dnepr River. The boundary line with it is as before. On the left the 38th Army is to advance on Kiev. The boundary line with it is as before. Confirm receipt.

Commander of Central Front,
Arm Gen Rokossovskiy

Member of Front Military Council
Lt Gen Telegin

Chief of Staff
Col Gen Malinin

(TsAMO, folio 201, inv. 398, file 21, sheet 145).

Document 4

BATTLE ORDER FROM COMMANDER OF VORONEZH FRONT OF 23 SEPTEMBER 1943
TO COMMANDER OF 40th AND 3d GUARDS TANK ARMIES ⁶

I order:

To reinforce in every possible way the troops which have crossed to the west bank of the Dnepr River. As quickly and as much as possible to move across the artillery, antitank mines in order to drive off any enemy counterattack. All likely tank approaches on the bridgehead are to be mined with the mines removed as the troops advance.

Report execution.

Vatutin

Ivanov

Khrushchev

(TsAMO, folio 203, inv. 2777, file 98, sheet 214).

Document 5

FROM THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE VORONEZH FRONT
TO THE CHIEF OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE RED ARMY OF
13 OCTOBER 1943

Content: on the courage and valor of personnel from the units of the Voronezh Front shown in the battles for the right bank of the Dnepr.

On 2 October, the enemy, in counterattacking the battle formations of the units where Comrade Boldyrev was the chief of the political section, threw up to 2 fresh infantry battalions and about 50 tanks supported by a large amount of artillery against them. Due to the exceptional tenacity of the personnel, all enemy counterattacks were driven off with great losses for the enemy: much of the Nazi infantry was destroyed, 19 tanks, predominantly heavy ones, were hit and equipment captured including: 8 machine guns, 40 rifles and other military equipment.

In this battle the men of the 1st Company particularly distinguished themselves. There were just 28 men, and they were attacked by around a battalion of Nazis. But the Soviet soldiers did not retreat a single step, having exterminated up to 100 Nazi soldiers and officers. With the aid of the arriving adjacent subunits, the enemy was thrown back. The sergeant major of the company, Comrade Nadtochayev, under heavy enemy fire continuously carried ammunition to the firing positions and simultaneously provided help to the wounded. The private and member of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)], Comrade Yakovlev let an enemy tank pass over his foxhole and then with the accurate throwing of a grenade hit it and gunned down the tank crew with a sub-machine gun....

Over the 2 days of enemy counterattacks, the men and officers from the units where Comrade Romanov is the chief of the political section set afire 18 German tanks and hit 2 of them. The combat engineers from the platoon of the junior lieutenant and VKP(b) member, Comrade Leusenko, set minefields with the PTM-5 mines and during the night of 3-4 October, 2 German tanks and 4 armored vehicles which the enemy had committed to break through our defenses were blown up. Sr Lt Moisyenko, in being in the battle formations of the subunit, by his personal example inspired the men to repel the enemy counterattacks, and in being wounded, did not leave the battlefield until the successful repelling of the counterattack. The Komsomol organizer of the 1st Rifle Battalion, Lt Sumtsov, in being in the battle formations, was wounded twice but did not leave the battlefield until the complete repelling of the attack by Nazi tanks and infantry. The machine gunner, Sgt Petr Bovk, at a moment when the enemy infantry was close up to our defenses, secretly moved up his own medium machine gun and at point blank range fired on up to a company of enemy soldiers. The platoon of 45-mm cannons of Sr Sgt, Comrade Prokov'yev, distinguished itself in destroying 2 tanks and over a company of Nazis by the firing of its cannons.

The agitator from the rifle regiment, Capt Shevchenko, and the military medic from the regiment, Capt Med Serv Roschislav, with 4 soldiers checked out a battery captured from the enemy and by direct laying fired on 2 German cannons along with their crews. A large enemy group endeavored to drive off the

captured battery but the courageous six at point-blank range fired on the Nazis from their own weapons, destroying up to 60 soldiers and officers. The enemy counterattack was successfully driven off....

The commander of the medical platoon, Military Feldsher Raisa Petrovna Filatova during the day carried 52 wounded from the battlefield to shelter. Being wounded, she unstintingly continued working until all the wounded had been ferried to the left bank of the Dnepr.

Up to 50 Nazis with the support of 9 tanks attacked the crew of the antitank cannon of Lt Borisov. Comrade Borisov allowed the enemy to come within 40 m and at point-blank range hit 3 tanks. The entire crew perished.

The Komsomol member, Pvt Borovskiy perished heroically. When our infantry on 26 September crossed the Dnepr, a Nazi group which had broken through to the bank opened fire on the landing troops. Being on the left bank of the Dnepr, Comrade Borovskiy opened up lethal fire from his machine gun at the enemy and having killed up to 40 Nazis, sent the remainder to flight. After this he saw that some of our wounded soldiers were drowning in the Dnepr. Locating a boat, Comrade Borovskiy rushed to help and in two trips saved 11 men. When Comrade Borovskiy was making a third trip, an enemy bullet cut the brave man down....

In capturing an elevation a group of scouts [from the formation] where Comrade Vedekhin is the chief of the political section rushed to the attack and was the first to take the hill, but the enemy machine gun fire cut them off from the main forces of the regiment. Regardless of this, the men under the leadership of Sgt Syropyatov continued to steadfastly hold the achieved line. Syropyatov himself, heavily wounded, did not weaken in directing combat for a minute. The handful of brave men fought until the regiment under the command of Lt Col Bushtruk, by an outflanking maneuver and attack from the rear, drove out the Germans and completely occupied the elevation....

The commander of the gun crew from the formation where Comrade Prokov'yev is the chief of the political section, the communist, Sr Sgt Mezentsev after his crew had been knocked out, himself loaded, aimed and fired the gun, and by accurate fire destroyed 2 enemy machine guns, he stopped tanks and killed up to 30 Nazis, dying a death of the brave.

The assistant platoon commander, the communist, Sr Sgt Ivlev raised all the men in the company to the attack, he personally destroyed 40 Nazis and died a death of the brave. The communist, Jr Lt Litvinov, crawled close to a German tank and threw an antitank grenade beneath it. The tank was hit. Communist Blazhko using a machine pistol hit a German fighter aircraft. The nurse Gul'yayeva, regardless of heavy artillery and machine gun fire, carried 30 wounded soldiers and officers with their weapons from the battlefield....

A group of enemy sub-machine gunners was beseiging one of our subunits. Then the Komsomol members Levashev, Tolykov and Chalov outflanked the sub-machine gunners and made a surprise attack against them from the rear. The Nazis fled in panic, leaving more than two-score corpses on the battlefield.

The unit of Maj Kobelev distinguished itself also in battle. Having driven off several counterattacks, during the day it destroyed over 200 Nazis. A gun crew from this unit under the command of Sgt Vas'kin by direct laying neutralized the fire of 3 enemy machine guns, killing 70 Nazis and capturing 2 of them.

A platoon of antitank gunners from the Papelyukh unit under the command of Sr Lt Kuznetsov on one of the crucial sections was alone against the enemy without infantry support. For 2 days the platoon fought continuously against the enemy, it repeatedly rose to the attack and drove off the enemy....

In combat the commander of one battalion of the Gromov unit was knocked out. His place was taken by the commander of the mortar platoon, Lt Shevchuk. Being in the battle formations of the battalion, Shevchuk turned to the men with the following words: "The motherland orders us to stand until death. We will die, friends, but we will defend the right bank of the Dnepr."

Emboldened by such an appeal, the personnel under the skillful command of Shevchuk drove off all enemy counterattacks. During this battle Comrade Shevchuk using a machine gun and rifle killed 49 Nazis and took one prisoner. As a total Shevchuk had to his score up to 100 killed Nazis and 7 prisoners....

One of the first to cross to the right bank was the platoon commanded by the communist Lt Oreshchenko from the Petrov unit. The squad of Sgt Yusup Manbitaliyev particularly distinguished itself. Having landed on the shore, the men quickly advanced, they sealed off the far house of the population point, they killed the Nazi sub-machine gunners in there and took over the house.

A group of the assistant platoon commander, Sr Sgt Shablakh Sabzhayev fought bravely. The men of the platoon, Lenskiy, Basov, Ageyev and Rezhikov were the first to reach the shore and they dug in. The enemy undertook several counterattacks but the courageous soldiers did not retreat a single step and all perished in unequal battle.

The orderly, Komsomol member Babichev, in carrying out a combat mission was surrounded by a group of Nazis who tried to capture him. Having consumed 2 cartridge discs, Babichev killed 22 of them but the ring of encirclement came ever-tighter. With the last bullet the Hero Komsomol member killed himself, preferring death to Nazi captivity.... One of the first to cross in the sub-unit of Capt Sava was a group of 19 men under the command of Sr Sgt Nefedov. Seated silently in the previously prepared boats were Sr Sgt Nefedov, the medium machine gunner Kotlyarevskiy, the assistant platoon commander Sgt Novosil'tsev, the light machine gunner Pvt Borovik and others. Fighting hard against the river's current, the men skillfully maneuvered between exploding mortar shells with which the Germans were methodically bombarding the river.

After 30 minutes, when the right bank was near, the enemy detected the approach of the Soviet soldiers and opened heavy fire. Having jumped into the water, the Red Army men spread out along the bank and opened return fire. The Nazis could not withstand their accurate fire and fled to the rear. The assault troops used this, they advanced, they dug in and with a rocket let it be known that the bridgehead was secure for further landing....

The forward detachment of Sr Lt Yurchenko was ordered to cross to the western bank during the night of 3 October (the unit of Comrade Corbonos). The squad of Sr Sgt Aleksandr Lavrent'yevich Mustayev was the first to land on the opposite bank. The Komsomol member Jr Sgt Shorinikov while still several meters away from the shore jumped into the water and by accurate rifle rounds destroyed two Nazis....

The Red Armymen Dmitriy Semenovich Kopak, Yevgeniy Boryak, Ivan Yevgen'yevich Grosman, Nikolay Mikhaylovich Oskol'nikov and Ivan Vladimirovich Tret'yakov volunteered to take the subunits of the unit of Comrade Fokin across the river. In crossing the rapid current, each of them made 45-50 trips in row boats under continuous enemy shelling.

The Red Armyman, Combat Engr Volkov from the unit of Comrade Corbonos during daylight crossed to the right bank six times and under heavy shelling brought back wounded requiring immediate medical aid.

When the subunits of the Petrov unit were crossing the Dnepr, their position was not known due to the lack of communications. The candidate member of the VKP(b), the Red Armyman Istomin and the non-party person Comrade Dolgikh were ordered to establish contact. In carrying out the mission, the signalmen lay a line to one of the small islands in the middle of the river. Suddenly nearby they saw a motorboat carrying up to 10 Nazis. The boat was quickly approaching the island. Istomin and Dolgikh opened fire from a light machine gun and sank the boat along with all the Nazis in it....

A group of soldiers of Sr Lts Stepuk and Kolonov reached the enemy rear and drew the enemy's attention and when the Nazis had turned their weapons and began ranging, Officer Stepuk moved his subunit back. For 6 hours the Nazis conducted heavy fire against a completely empty area and when the fire began to abate, Stepuk led his men to the attack and captured important positions....

In combat the rifle company under the command of Sr Lt Leshchenko distinguished itself. During a day this company three times drove off enemy attacks. At the end of the day the enemy attacked the subunit a fourth time. Encountering organized automatic, machine gun and volley rifle fire, the enemy began to retreat, leaving 32 bodies on the battlefield. Leshchenko's men took advantage of this, they went over to the counterattack, they advanced to a new line and dug in securely on it....

The personnel of the combat engineer brigade where Comrade Chertov was the chief of the political section worked courageously in the crossing. They had to work 25-30 hours without rest. During the night of 6-7 September, in crossing to the right bank of the Dnepr, a majority of the crossing crews made 16-17 trips. In 18 hours the crew of the commander, Sgt Comrade Stankov, made 17 trips, transporting to the right bank of the Dnepr 4 motor vehicles, a tractor, 25 tons of ammunition and 20 carts with horses. The crews of Jr Sgts Lobanov and Yakovlev each made 16 trips.

Of great importance in improving the morale of the men was the presentation on 6 October of governmental decorations to the privates, sergeants and officers who distinguished themselves in the crossings. The awards were presented directly at the crossing sites....

The prisoners stated that the command had ordered that the Russians be stopped at the Dnepr River at any price, regardless of the difficulties and losses.

Chief of Political Directorate of Voronezh Front,
Maj Gen S. Shatilov

(TsAMO, folio 203, inv. 2847, file 43, sheets 23-25).

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ TsAMO SSSR, folio 203, inv. 292045, file 2, sheet 12.
- ² The directive was also forwarded to G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy.
- ³ The code name of I. V. Stalin.
- ⁴ The directive was also forwarded to G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy.
A copy of this document was received by the commander of the Southern Front.
- ⁵ A battle order of analogous content was forwarded to the commander of the 13th Army.
- ⁶ A copy of this document was forwarded to G. K. Zhukov and the Chief of the General Staff.

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BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON MAR SU A. I. YEGOROV GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 50-55

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col S. Gusarevich: "Soldier, Military Leader, Theoretician (on the 100th Birthday of Mar SU A. I. Yegorov)"]

[Text] Aleksandr Il'ich Yegorov holds a worthy place among the glorious cohort of Soviet military leaders and chiefs trained by the Leninist party during the years of the Civil War.¹

He was among those military specialists who after the victory of Great October moved decisively to the side of Soviet power and wholeheartedly devoted all his strength to the cause of protecting the Soviet republic. Working as a member of the special commission directed by V. I. Lenin, A. I. Yegorov showed full understanding of the need to create new armed forces and took an active part in working out the decree on the founding of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army].²

The treacherous policy of the leadership of the leftist SR Party to which A. I. Yegorov belonged on the questions of war and peace in the context of concluding the Brest Treaty and the adventuristic attempt by the leftist SR's to seize power during the July days of 1918 finally convinced Aleksandr Il'ich that the Leninist party was right. On 16 July he came out with a special appeal in the newspaper PRAVDA in which he gave his reasons for decisively breaking with the leftist SR's and at the end of the month was accepted as a member of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)].

A. I. Yegorov made a marked contribution to the organizational development of the young Red Army and its leadership bodies. In holding responsible posts in the Military Section of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], and on the All-Russian Chief Staff and being the chairman of the Higher Certification Commission for Selecting Former Officers into the Red Army, he proved himself to be a convinced supporter of creating a disciplined regular army and the centralizing of military leadership.

On 14 August 1918, Aleksandr Il'ich in a brief note to the chairman of the Higher Military Inspectorate, N. I. Podvoyskiy, raised the question of the centralizing of military leadership, having proposed that the entire Soviet republic be declared in an extraordinary military-revolutionary status and that they

form a "military-revolutionary staff for the defense of the social revolution and the fatherland" headed by Comrade Lenin....³

In developing this idea, A. I. Yegorov on 20 August forwarded a special report to V. I. Lenin. In referring to the experience of military history, he affirmed that "a military leader should be given full power" and that "only one will can direct operations." The then existing system of controlling combat operations, when the Red Army was actually subordinate to two higher military organs--to the Operations Section of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and to the Higher Military Council--led to contradictory instructions, uncoordinated troop movements and interruptions in their supply. Having analyzed the existing situation, Aleksandr Il'ich proposed that a supreme commander-in-chief responsible to the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] be appointed and that a staff be organized under him. He wrote: "The legal and actual duality and ambiguity of the present situation for the troops are intolerable and involve extremely acute consequences of failure on the fronts and, consequently, the loss of the Soviet republic and the revolution. For this reason it is essential to immediately adopt measures to unify the command of combat operations and immediately make this universally known."⁴

Having read the report, V. I. Lenin issued orders to immediately forward copies of the document to inform the responsible military leaders. For the people's commissar of military affairs he added the note: "Think about this. Shouldn't Vatsetisa be appointed supreme commander-in-chief?"⁵ The idea of establishing a higher collective body for controlling the young Red Army found support among many party and military workers and was actually embodied in the founding of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council (RVSR) and the establishing of the position of commander-in-chief of all the Republic Armed Forces.

At the end of August 1918, A. I. Yegorov, upon his request, was sent to the front and appointed the commander of the Soviet troops fighting in the Balashov--Kamyshin area against the White Cossacks of Gen Krasnov. With his inherent energy and tenacity, Aleksandr Il'ich in a comparatively short period of time was able to not only establish proper order and subordinate the partisan detachments comprising the 9th Army to a single will but also organize successful combat operations on the Filonov and Serebryakov sectors, thereby providing substantial aid to the defenders of Tsaritsyn. On 26 December, when the situation again became complicated here, A. I. Yegorov was appointed the commander of the 10th Army.

The new army commander immediately had to seek out ways and means to throw back the enemy which had broken through to the suburbs of the city. Aleksandr Il'ich found a bold and original solution which was the result of a correct assessment of the major role played by the cavalry formations in the highly fluid Civil War. He shifted the Composite Cavalry Division under the command of B. M. Dumenko from the southern defensive sector of Tsaritsyn to the northern one in the area of Dubovka, where the enemy had superiority in cavalry, and gave it an independent operational mission: to break through the White Cossack front and having made a deep raid in the enemy rear, thwart its advance against the city. The Red cavalry drove the enemy out of Dubovka, they defeated the White cavalry units and then under the command of S. M. Budennyi⁶ carried out a

successful raid and established favorable conditions for the going over to an offensive by the entire 10th Army and for defeating the White Cossacks. After this raid, A. I. Yegorov was completely confirmed on his view of the cavalry as a powerful and maneuverable force.

The dedication of A. I. Yegorov to maneuvering and to the massed employment of highly mobile cavalry formations became a characteristic trait in all his generalship activities. The combat capabilities of a large cavalry formation were first tried out by him in the battles on the Sal River in May 1919. Here the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions united by the verbal order of A. I. Yegorov into a cavalry corps caused severe losses to the advancing White Guards. The successful experiment was used by the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army as grounds for organizing the I Cavalry Corps. In these battles the personal bravery of the army commander was particularly apparent and he during a crucial moment led the Red squadrons of the 6th Cavalry Division into the attack and, regardless of a severe wound, did not leave the battlefield until the deputy summoned by him had arrived. For this feat A. I. Yegorov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In the summer of 1919, as a result of the offensive by the Denikin troops, the situation in the south of the Soviet Republic significantly deteriorated. The enemy was pushing toward Moscow. In July, A. I. Yegorov was appointed the commander of the 14th Army which initially was covering Kiev, then Bryansk and in heavy defensive battles against superior enemy forces was being forced to retreat.

At the end of September 1919, a plenum of the RKP(b) Central Committee approved a decision to send additional reserves and the best commanders and political workers to the south of the republic and to assign major forces to the Tula area for covering Moscow. Upon instructions of the party Central Committee, the Southern Front was split into two independent ones: the Southern and Southeastern. During the first days of October, A. I. Yegorov was confirmed in the position of the commander of the Southern Front and he immediately began preparing a counteroffensive. Being a supporter of the bold massing of men and weapons on a crucial sector, the commander created an assault group of reinforcements which had arrived from the Western Front (a rifle division and brigade, a cavalry brigade and other units).⁷ Aleksandr Il'ich was virtually constantly in the troops, where, relying on the party aktiv, the commanders and political workers, he endeavored to instill in the men an unswerving confidence in victory and explained the need to conduct an active offensive against the enemy. "A method of lively, constant leadership by the superior command and frequent personal contact with subordinates in the prompt giving of missions to the troops," he later wrote, "could not help but contribute to success."⁸

In carrying out the instructions of the Red Army High Command, A. I. Yegorov worked out a plan for the going over of the Southern Front to a counteroffensive and selected the most decisive form of an operational maneuver, that is, the making of flank attacks by the forces of the assault group in the Orel area and by Budenny's Cavalry Corps in the region of Voronezh for the purpose of destroying the basic Denikin forces. In the directive to the armies of the front, he drew particular attention to the necessity of bold maneuvering and the concentrating of the forces on the main sectors. "In carrying out the set tasks,

I categorically demand that the army commanders and the chief of the assault group advance not by lines but rather by making flank attacks by concentrated forces against the main enemy forces fighting on the most important sectors, bearing in mind that success can be achieved only by maneuvering," emphasized the front's commander.

In the course of the counteroffensive by the Southern Front, the best forces of the Volunteer Army were defeated. There was a fundamental change in the fight against the Denikin troops, and favorable conditions were created for a general offensive by the Southern and Southeastern Fronts ending with the final defeat of the Denikin armies. The commander of the front, A. I. Yegorov, clearly demonstrated in practice the best examples of Soviet military art which developed in the course of the Civil War, that is: activeness and decisiveness, the making of attacks by concentrated forces on the most important sectors in the enemy flank and rear and the broad employment of maneuvering.

Aleksandr Il'ich remained loyal to these principles also in the post of commander of the Southwestern Front the troops of which in January-February 1920 successfully carried out the mission of the final liberation of the Right Bank Ukraine and particularly in the course of the Soviet-Polish War. Indicative in this regard was the Kiev Operation conducted from 16 May through 17 June 1920. Its overall concept was to surround the enemy grouping (the 3d and a portion of the 2d Polish Armies) by deep enveloping attacks by the 12th Army to the north of Kiev and by the 1st Horse Army to the southwest of Kiev and in cooperation with the troops of the Fastov Group advancing from the front, to destroy the enemy grouping and create prerequisites for a complete defeat of the White Poles in the Ukraine. Such a bold decision was adopted under conditions when the enemy had a significant numerical superiority in personnel.

The defeat of the Polish interventionists in the Kiev Operation marked the beginning to their complete expulsion from Soviet land. Although it was not possible to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping completely, it suffered a major defeat. The Polish Command was forced to shift significant forces from Belorussia to the Ukraine and this created favorable conditions for the armies of the Western Front to go over to an offensive there.

For outstanding accomplishments during the years of the Civil War, the VTsIK awarded A. I. Yegorov an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon in 1921.¹⁰ A recommendation of the Revolutionary-Military Council of the Southwestern Front commented on his best qualities as a military leader: "...The first is the ability to correctly assess the strategic situation of the sides, clarity and always boldness in setting the basic mission with indefatigable work in the process of achieving its success; secondly, the skillful use of all types of equipment as a result of the careful study and clear understanding of its role in military affairs; thirdly, a detailed acquaintance and a continuous observance of progress in military thought and its theory; fourthly, broad creative initiative expressed in the idea (and its realization) of using in achieving strategic missions the principle of a single controlled maneuvering attack by a mass of cavalry as the prevailing factor for success in the Civil War (the Budennyi Army)."^{10a}

The Communist Party and the Soviet government repeatedly entrusted Aleksandr Il'ich with responsible military posts in peacetime. He commanded the troops of the Kiev and Petrograd Military Districts, the Western Front and the Caucasus Red Banner Army and headed the armed forces of the Ukraine and Crimea. A. I. Yegorov wholeheartedly dedicated all his talent to the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces. He gave great deal of attention to the training of the Red Army personnel. In October 1927, A. I. Yegorov was appointed the commander of the Belorussian Military District where he made a great effort to actually introduce the new equipment being received by the formations and units.

The substantial changes occurring in weaponry and the organization of the armies in the USSR and abroad necessitated the further development of military-theoretical thought as well as the generalizing of the Civil War's experience. A. I. Yegorov did a good deal of work in this area. The result of his research was two books: "L'vov--Varshava. 1920 god. Vzaimodeystviye frontov" [Lwow-Warsaw. 1920. Cooperation of Fronts] (1929) and "Razgrom Denikina. 1919" [The Defeat of Denikin. 1919] (1931). In these works, on the basis of documents and personal recollections, A. I. Yegorov examined many major events in the struggle against the interventionists and White Guards and drew profound theoretical generalizations and conclusions on the military art of the Red Army. In pointing to the fundamental advantages of Soviet military art, he wrote: "Both the front and high command based the implementing of the plan on the broad and strong support of the Communist Party and all the workers of the nation and on the strong unity of the rear and the front...."¹¹

On the basis of generalizing the experience of the Civil War, A. I. Yegorov reached the conclusion that a future war "would be waged with full enthusiasm, decisiveness and a determination to carry it out to a victorious end, but on an immeasurably higher technical basis and with a better balance of class forces for the proletariat."¹²

Being one of the initiators of the technical rearming of the Red Army, A. I. Yegorov gave great attention to creating the armored forces. He considered them the chief means of maneuver in a future war.

Aleksandr Il'ich made a significant contribution to the development of Soviet military theory in the position of the chief of staff of the RKKA (from 1935, the General Staff). In the summer of 1932, he submitted to the USSR Revolutionary-Military Council the theses "Tactics and Operational Art of the RKKA in the Beginning of the 1930's." The main idea of the theses was that in a future war it was essential to give a maneuvering nature to operations and to combat. The conclusions of this document state: "The basic problem of today is the simultaneous development of combat operations to a great depth. This problem is central both in tactics and in operational art."¹³ The theses served as the basis for the issuing of the "Temporary Instructions on the Organizing of Combat in Depth" sent out to the troops.

In 1935 I. A. Yegorov was among the first to be awarded the high rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. In May 1937, he was appointed the USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and in January 1938, the Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.

A. I. Yegorov combined enormous military activities with social and political ones. He was a candidate member of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee from 1934 and a member of the VTsIK and the USSR TsIK Central Executive Committee and a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, First Sitting. The motherland highly regarded his contributions and awarded him two Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of the Red Banner of Georgia and Azerbaijan and an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon.

In holding high and responsible posts, Aleksandr Il'ich remained an extraordinarily humble and responsive person. Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy recalled: "Many of us who knew A. I. Yegorov recall...his gentle, truly folk humor, a human charm, and a special cordiality combined with a steel military will."¹⁴

The memory of Aleksandr Il'ich Yegorov, a soldier, military leader and theoretician, will always remain in the history of the Soviet People and their Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ A. I. Yegorov (born 13 (25) October 1883 and died 23 February 1939) was born in the town of Buzuluk, now Orenburg Oblast. In 1905, he completed the Kazan Infantry Junker School. During the years of World War I, on the front he rose from a company commander to a regiment commander, he was wounded five times in combat, he was awarded six combat orders and the St. George's Weapon and had the rank of colonel.
- ² ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV, No 1, 1962, p 202.
- ³ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1967, p 98.
- ⁴ "Direktivy Glavnogo komandovaniya Krasnoy Armii (1917-1920). Sbornik dokumentov" [Directives of the High Command of the Red Army (1917-1920). Collection of Documents], Voenizdat, 1969, p 51.
- ⁵ LENINSKIY SBORNIK, XXXVII, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 101.
- ⁶ B. M. Dumenko at this time was sick.
- ⁷ "Direktivy komandovaniya frontov Krasnoy Armii (1917-1922)" [Directives of the Command of the Red Army Fronts (1917-1921)], Vol 2, pp 349-350 (below--DKFKA).
- ⁸ A. I. Yegorov, "Razgrom Denikina. 1919" [The Defeat of Denikin. 1919], Voenizdat, 1931, p 148.
- ⁹ DKFKA, Vol 2, p 350.
- ¹⁰ For more detail see: "VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1966, p 67-68.
- ^{10a} ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV, No 1, 1962, p 206.

¹¹ A. I. Yegorov, op. cit., p 154.

¹² Ibid., p 218.

¹³ "Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voyennykh trudakh (1917-1940)" [Questions of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Works (1917-1940)], Voenizdat, 1965, p 383.

¹⁴ VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1973, p 43.

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WORLD WAR II CAREER DATA OF MAR SU A. A. GRECHKO GIVEN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 55-60

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Professor, Army Gen S. P. Ivanov: "A Military Leader of the Soviet School (on the 80th Birthday of Mar SU A. A. Grechko)*"]

[Text] The service record of the future military leader started in the difficult year of 1919. Precisely then, in the difficult time for the young Soviet Republic, he arrived, as a 16-year-old peasant youth from the village of Golodavevka (now Kuybyshevo in Kuybyshevskiy Rayon of Rostov Oblast) under the colors of the 1st Horse Army. This happened in a December day, when the men of the 11th Cavalry Division were arriving there. The tall, strong fellow who had joined the army seemed a natural for military service and he was accepted. The young cavalryman, having quickly mastered the rules of service, courageously fought for Soviet power. Then, in continuing to serve in various command positions, he worked unceasingly, improving the training of his subordinate subunits and units and continuously broadening his viewpoint as a commander.

* Andrey Antonovich Grechko was born 4 (17) October 1903. He joined the Soviet Army in 1919. He was a member of the CPSU since 1928. He completed the Cavalry School (1926), the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze (1936) and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1941).

He was a participant in the Civil War. In the 1920's and 1930's, he was in command of a platoon, a squadron, and in the post of the chief of staff of a cavalry division participated in the liberation campaign into Western Belorussia (September 1939).

During the first days of the Great Patriotic War, A. A. Grechko was working on the General Staff. At his personal request, in November 1941, he was appointed the commander of the 34th Cavalry Division, and from January 1942 successively commanded the V Cavalry Corps and the 12th, 47th, 18th and 56th Armies. In the position of Deputy Commander of the Voronezh Front, he participated in the liberation of Kiev. From December 1943 until the end of the war he headed the troops of the 1st Guards Army.

Andrey Antonovich Grechko entered the Great Patriotic War as a mature, thoroughly prepared commander, having behind him two academies, the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and the Academy of the General Staff. How Andrey Antonovich started the war I was told by my friend, fellow worker and fellow serviceman, Army Gen N. G. Lyashchenko. He stated, in particular, that he became acquainted with A. A. Grechko on a bad autumn day of 1941, when the 255th Rifle Division, in cooperation with the 34th Cavalry Division under the command of A. A. Grechko, was conducting fierce battles in the area of the town of Izyum. The commander of the 34th Cavalry Division arrived at the observation post of the 972d Rifle Regiment of the 255th Rifle Division in order to become acquainted with the situation and coordinate forthcoming actions and greatly helped the infantrymen with his advice.

In the heavy battles of 1941, the cavalry units under the command of A. A. Grechko steadfastly held the defenses, they retreated only upon orders and frequently broke through into the enemy rear.

Having obtained the rank of major general, Andrey Antonovich in January 1942 was appointed commander of the V Cavalry Corps. In the Barbenkovo-Lozovskiy Offensive Operation, in cooperation with rifle units, the formations of the corps crushed the enemy in the area of Barbenkovo and pushed deep into the rear of the Nazi troops. The cavalry forces there showed examples of self-sacrifice, courage and military entrepreneurship and this was largely due to their commander.

When one recalls the military leadership activities of Andrey Antonovich, the first to come to mind is the battle for the Caucasus in the course of which he successively was in command of the 12th, 47th, 18th and 56th Armies. The army commander A. A. Grechko from the beginning to the end went through all the convolutions of the defensive and offensive periods of this battle and these were marked by many specific features. The operations and battles were conducted on the broad plains of the Kuban and Stavropol area, in forests, foothills, in mountains and the alpine passes of the Greater Caucasus. There were fierce battles for the numerous water barriers, the seacoast, the most important Black Sea ports, as well as the major industrial and administrative centers. In the battle for the Caucasus, the ground forces cooperated most closely with the Navy and aviation. Here amphibious landings were widely employed and the rifle units and formations participated in them along with the naval infantry. The engagements for the Caucasus were characterized by the active involvement in them of partisan detachments, as well as cavalry formations of the Don and Kuban Cossacks. These were conducted on territory inhabited by different nationalities.

Under the difficult conditions, Andrey Antonovich showed enviable restraint, firmness and demonstrated high operational-tactical maturity. Steadfastness and courage and the ability to skillfully organize the maneuvering of men and equipment, to find a way out of a seemingly hopeless situation and thereby defeat numerically superior enemy forces always distinguished him. The troops led by him were a single and precise organism determined to worthily carry out the orders of the motherland and the will of the party.

Considering the high volitional qualities and leadership talent of A. A. Grechko and his ability to achieve the unconditional fulfillment of the most difficult tasks, the military council of the Black Sea Troop Group entrusted the 47th Army which he commanded with the responsible task of destroying the enemy grouping which had broken through to the northeast of Novorossiysk.

At dawn of 25 September 1942, the 77th Rifle Division, the 255th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 83d Naval Rifle Brigade which were part of the army and had been trained under the personal leadership of the army commander made a counter-strike against the enemy. As a result of the 2-day fierce battles, the Nazi grouping was crushed and the army troops forced the Nazi Command once and for all to abandon an offensive in this sector and prevented the enemy from reaching the Black Sea coast. The eastern shore of Tsemes Bay remained in our hands while the bay itself could be fired on by the machine gun, mortar and artillery fire of the Soviet troops.

Andrey Antonovich made a noteworthy contribution to the preparation and execution of operations on the Tuapse sector, where in the autumn of 1942 the situation had become extremely complex. On 19 October, under exceptionally difficult conditions, he assumed the command of the 18th Army. In November, a portion of its forces together with other troops successfully conducted an operation to eliminate the Nazi Semash grouping which was trying to cross the Main Caucasus Range. The personnel of the troops subordinate to A. A. Grechko in fierce battles with the enemy showed invincible steadfastness, high courage and mass heroism.

In January 1943, the Transcaucasian Front went over to an offensive. In the zone of the Black Sea Troop Group, the main thrust was to be made by the 56th Army, the command of which had been assumed by Andrey Antonovich on 5 January. The conditions of this offensive were not easy. The men had to cross impassible slopes and move, at times carrying, the guns, ammunition and other loads over the mountain paths. However, the troops of the army in 7 days were able to break through the enemy permanent defenses, to advance scores of kilometers and descend from the mountains into the plains.

The engagements on the territory of Krasnodar Kray were unbelievably difficult. The Nazi Command had resorted to truly Draconian measures to increase the strength of its troops on the defensive but this did not reduce the offensive drive of men in the 56th Army during its rapid push and particularly the approach to the last enemy strongpoint, Kordon, and to the northern part of the Kerch Strait.

The army crossed the estuaries and flooded areas and the Kuban River and with their own main forces maneuvered to the north into the rear of the enemy troops which were endeavoring to dig in to the west of Temryuk. By the evening of 8 October 1943, the command of the 56th Army had brought up artillery and after a 30-minute artillery softening up the Soviet troops began a decisive attack. Early in the morning of 9 October, the commander of the 56th Army, Lt Gen A. A. Grechko, reported to the front's military council: "The Taman Peninsula by 0700 hours on 9 October 1943 was completely cleared of German occupiers by the units of the 56th Army."¹

¹ The Taman Peninsula was liberated by the 56th Army in cooperation with the 9th and 18th Armies.

Andrey Antonovich, as the deputy commander of the Voronezh Front, made a definite contribution to the liberation of the capital of the Ukraine, ancient Kiev. At that time I happened to be the chief of staff of the First Ukrainian Front and I knew the style of his work as well as anyone. Tall, limber, always smart, with a true cavalry bearing, he excelled in neatness, he always delved deeply into the details of major questions and had a good idea of the tasks confronting the troops of the front.

Our front, during that period, was in terms of strength one of the most powerful of all the Soviet formations because the task of broadening the bridgeheads on the Dnepr and expelling the invaders from Kiev was unusually difficult. We had to operate from the small Dnepr bridgeheads. The Nazi troops, in carrying out the Führer's orders, as they say, fought to the death for the western bank of the Dnepr. I had participated in many operations, including very difficult ones, but neither before nor later had I ever seen such superhuman effort with which we worked then in order to ensure the rapid liberation of the Ukrainian capital and save it from complete destruction and the inhabitants of Kiev from general destruction.

The Kiev Offensive Operation is instructive in the concentrating of major forces on a limited bridgehead and in the covert regrouping of a mass of tanks and artillery from one bridgehead to another in a difficult situation and in a short period of time. This determined the surprise of the attack and its successful development on several axes.

An important stage in the military biography of A. A. Grechko was his command of the 1st Guards Army. The operations conducted by this field force as part of the First and later the Fourth Ukrainian Fronts was certainly as difficult as those which Andrey Antonovich had prepared and carried out in the course of the battle for the Caucasus.

In summing up the combat activities of A. A. Grechko during the years of the Great Patriotic War, it is essential to emphasize the boldness of the military leader's operational-tactical plans, the initiative and tenacity in carrying out complex combat missions, the flexibility and originality of operational thinking, affection for the Soviet soldier and the greatest possible concern for his needs.

The Great Patriotic War was over. But the aggressive aspirations of imperialism had not changed and A. A. Grechko generously devoted his vast knowledge, acquired combat experience and remarkable leadership talent to the cause of further raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. During the postwar years he was in command of the Kiev Military District and was the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. From November 1957, Mar SU A. A. Grechko was the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense and the

See: the works of A. A. Grechko: "Bitva za Kavkaz" [The Battle for the Caucasus], Voenizdat, 1973; "Osvobozhdeniye Kiyeva" [The Liberation of Kiev], Moscow, Znaniye, 1973; "Cherez Karpaty" [Across the Carpathians], Voenizdat, 1971; "Gody voyny" [Years of War], Voenizdat, 1976.

Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and from 1960, the USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. In April 1967, A. A. Grechko was appointed the USSR Minister of Defense. With his active participation, there was further improvement in the troops and naval forces, their combat skills, arming with new combat equipment and as a whole the strengthening of the defense might of our socialist power.

A. A. Grechko was twice awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and received many orders and medals. He carried out great state and party work, he was a delegate to a number of the CPSU congresses and was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee and a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In April 1973, A. A. Grechko was elected a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

All the life of one of the active builders of the USSR Armed Forces, the military leader Mar SU Andrey Antonovich Grechko is an example of wholehearted service of the motherland, the party and the people.

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EVOLUTION OF U.S. MILITARY-STRATEGIC CONCEPTS TRACED

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[Article by Lt Gen M. Kozlov: "From the History of the Development of U.S. Military Strategic Concepts"]

[Text] In recent years the world has collided with a harsh reality, with the increased international tension and direct threat of the unleashing of a nuclear war by the imperialists. This has been caused by the actions of the most aggressive NATO circles and primarily by the United States which is endeavoring at any price to check the natural course of the historical process, to maintain the positions of imperialism, to subordinate the development of world events to its will and to clear the way for carrying out aggressive plans. For realizing these ideas, Washington has set the goal of disrupting the existing balance of strategic forces and achieving military supremacy.

The USSR and the allied socialist nations are opposing this militaristic and aggressive line of imperialism by a consistently constructive policy of peace, international security and detente, for freezing and then reducing to a lower level the military strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. They have done and will do everything to prevent a war, to reduce the military danger, to better the development of international relations and ensure peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems. The Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee supplemented the numerous peace-loving initiatives of the socialist commonwealth with new ones, in particular, it proposed concluding a treaty on the mutual renunciation of military force and the maintaining of relations of peace between the member nations of the two military-political groupings, the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The U.S. and NATO leading circles are endeavoring to "discard" these and many other peace-loving proposals of the Soviet Union and its friends. Blind hate for socialism has gotten the best of clear thinking. The monopolistic bourgeoisie in the leading capitalist countries, and primarily the United States, view military strength as a universal means for resolving all disputed problems of international policy. On this basis the official views of the American military-political leadership have been shaped concerning the essence of strategies and military-strategic concepts and the thesis of the politicizing of strategy and the militarizing of policy have been constantly "pushed."

In the publications and speeches of U.S. political and military leaders, one can trace three varieties or three levels of strategies: national strategy, the strategy of national security and military strategy.

National strategy is defined as "the art and science of the development and use of the nation's political, economic and psychological might along with the armed forces for achieving national goals under conditions of peace and war."¹ The strategy of national security views the questions of employing chiefly military force for "defending national interests against external and internal threats." For this reason the Americans frequently call it a "defense strategy," a "strategic doctrine," or simply "strategy," while among Soviet authors this is identified with military doctrine or even military strategy.

Military strategy is the inferior category but, according to the views of U.S. military theoreticians, it is concerned with the specific questions of the organizational development and use of the armed forces and with military-strategic planning and reflects the military aspects of the two previous strategies.

The U.S. military-strategic concepts are component elements of the national security strategy within which they are formulated and exist in close relation to the military-political concept reflecting predominantly the political aspect of national security strategy.

It is essential to bear in mind that on the official level the United States does not have a sufficiently strict classification of strategies and military-strategic concepts. The strategies and military-strategic concepts voiced or formulated by individuals and in agency documents are discussed by the secretary of defense, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council and are approved or confirmed by the president and become officially adopted. Their fulfillment is obligatory for all bodies and agencies. The military industrial complex has an active influence on the essence of the strategies and concepts.

The content of the American military-strategic concepts is determined by the development patterns of imperialism. Their focus is decisively influenced by the nature of the policy of American imperialism as well as by the quantitative and qualitative aspect of the weapons which it can employ in the interests of achieving its goals. The most important factor influencing the shaping of military-strategic concepts is the change in the balance of forces in the world and primarily the increased defense might of the USSR and the achieving in recent decades of a military-strategic equilibrium between socialism and imperialism. All the U.S. military-strategic concepts are based on the principle of using coalition forces. The positions of the neutral and nonaligned nations are also taken into account.

The U.S. ruling clique after World War II felt that their power was the mightiest in economic and military terms and stable on the political and social level. This supposedly gave them an opportunity to impose their conditions on the world. The illusion of omnipotence and hate for the socialist states led to militant anti-Sovietism and to a policy of nuclear blackmail and pressure. "The bomb will be of crucial significance for determining further U.S.

relations with other countries," stated the Pentagon chief Henry L. Stimson in 1945.

Already in 1945, the Pentagon was preparing an atomic attack on the USSR, and was working out war plans against the recent ally in the joint struggle against Nazism and Japanese militarism. Among the first documents which directly took up the idea of an attack on the USSR were: Directives 1496/2 "Basis for Formulating Military Policy" and 1518 "A Strategic Concept and Plan for the Use of U.S. Armed Forces" of 18 September and 9 October 1945, respectively, as well as the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee of 3 November 1945 No 329 entitled "Strategic Vulnerability of Russia for a Limited Air Attack."³ The last document demanded that 20 major targets be selected on Soviet territory for atomic strikes. These targets were chosen in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Gorkiv, Kuvbyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Tashkent and elsewhere. To Directive No 432/D of 14 December 1945 there was appended a map with the indicating of the objects and bases from where 196 nuclear strikes would be made against 20 Soviet cities.

During the first postwar years, plans for attack on the USSR were worked out, including: "Broiler," "Frolic," "Charioteer," "Cogwheel," "Chanpowder," "Fleetwood" and others. These differed in terms of the number of planned attacks, as well as in the changing of the targets and bases from which the air raids would be made.

President Truman in March 1947 proclaimed his own doctrine of "combating communism" and this was based upon the military-political concept of "containment" worked out by the prominent diplomat G. Kennan. Its essence was to create such a force which would ensure "containment" by "rigid punishment" for that state which would resort to the use of weapons against the United States and its allies. This policy was also reflected in military planning.

In 1948, the Strategic Air Command drew up its own first operations plan and in December the unified military operations plan "Trojan" was approved and this envisaged the dropping of 133 atomic bombs on 70 Soviet cities.

In 1949, the extraordinary Offtackle Plan was worked out. Its main idea was that "in collaboration with U.S. allies, American military plans vis-a-vis the Soviet Union were to be carried out, having destroyed its will and capacity to resist by conducting strategic offensive operations in Western Europe and a defensive strategy in the Far East."⁴ In the subsequent Trojan Plan, war was to start on 1 January 1950. U.S. aviation during the first three months of the war was to drop approximately 300 atomic bombs on targets located in 100 Soviet cities.

In 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff began working out the most barbarian plan under the name of Dropshot. During the first stage of the war, the beginning of which was moved back to 1 January 1957, the plan was to drop 300 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs on the USSR; in the second and third stages, in continuing the air strikes, a land offensive was to be initiated by the forces of 164 NATO divisions and at the same time control was to be established over the sea and ocean lines of communications. The total number of invasion forces was set at 20 million men. In the fourth stage of the

war, the USSR and the other socialist countries were to be occupied. The USSR territory was to be divided into four occupation zones including 22 "subregions of responsibility."

In 1949, the USSR successfully tested a hydrogen weapon. This overturned all the plans of Washington. The United States, fearing retaliation from the USSR, did not want to risk the use of the senseless plans for unleashing a war against our country. The calculations of "containing" the world revolutionary process, isolating and intimidating the USSR and betting on strength were unrealistic.

The government of D. Eisenhower which came to power in 1953 met the demands of the military-industrial complex and initiated a strategy of "massive retaliation" (1953-1960). Its essence was to have the United States ready to make the first or retaliatory massed nuclear strike against the USSR "at a point and under circumstances of its own choice." Officially the strategy was announced in a speech by J. F. Dulles on 12 January 1954. It was reflected in a 3-year plan for the development of the armed forces during the 1954-1957 period, in the new "National Military Program" adopted in 1956 and in the "Joint Plan of Strategic Goals" worked out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Military Program envisaged "the maintaining of military might ensuring the conduct of both a universal war as well as the fight against any other forms of aggression."

The "massive retaliation" strategy, under U.S. pressure, was also adopted as the official NATO strategy. Washington demanded the remilitarization of West Germany and increased military contributions by the members of the aggressive bloc. It made several attempts to restore capitalism in countries which had set out on the socialist path of development, it organized a series of coups in other states and provoked armed conflicts against Egypt and Lebanon.

In the 1940's and 50's, basic military-strategic concepts were officially adopted such as: "First Strike," "Forward Defenses," "Retaliatory Strike," "Limited Nuclear War" and others.

The "first strike" concept envisaged a pre-emptive U.S. strike by conventional but basically nuclear weapons and this, in their opinion, ensured the achieving of the set goals.

The "forward defenses" concept was aimed at creating groupings of U.S. armed forces or those of its allies as close as possible to the Soviet frontiers and on the building of numerous military bases in areas where the American military intended to strengthen its permanent military presence.

The "retaliatory strike" concept arose after criticism of the first concept and was depicted as peace-loving and defensive. In actuality it demanded decisive actions with the employment of the entire arsenal of U.S. attack weapons as a response to any armed conflict, that is, it assumed that nuclear weapons would be used first by the United States.

The concept of a "limited nuclear war" first began to be propagandized at the end of the 1950's, when the USSR had successfully tested intercontinental

ballistic missiles and had launched the world's first artificial satellite. It was an attempt to weaken the force of the retaliatory nuclear strike against vitally important U.S. centers. Initially the concept envisaged a limiting of the military conflict to just the use of tactical weapons and then the use of nuclear weapons only in areas distant from the United States.

In the 1960's, this concept assumed a new content, namely the limiting of strikes against cities and their shifting to selected targets, chiefly military installations. The falaciousness of such an approach is apparent, for no one can define the limits and in the world there was no approved list of installations which would be considered "military." Also it is impossible to distinguish where the "limited" war would end and where the "all-out" nuclear war would start, particularly under the conditions of the colossal build-up of U.S. strategic might.

In the 1970's, this concept was interpreted as a concept of "limited strategic wars" which under the conditions of a strategic parity was, in their opinion, the most probable.⁷ The altered interpretation of a "limited war" as set out in Carter's Directive No 59 was particularly dangerous. It was felt that a limited war was possible and the use of nuclear (neutron) weapons was acceptable and not so threatening.

The further strengthening of the socialist countries, their greater defense capability and the rise in the national liberation movement led the United States to reassess its strategic views. Fearing serious retaliatory measures, the White House Administration revised its policy and accepted a new strategy of a "flexible reponse" proposed by Gen M. Taylor (1961-1969). Its essence was set out in a special message from President J. Kennedy to Congress, where it was stated: "Our defense position should be both flexible and decisive.... We should have the ability to thoughtfully choose the types of weapons and strategy, to vary the pace of national production and alter the control of our troops in order to be able to adapt to changing conditions and goals in a short period of time and under any circumstances."⁸ The propaganda endeavored to convince one that the new strategy was a "strategy of victory." The United States soon began to actively increase the existing nuclear missile weapons, to build strategic offensive forces and strategic defensive forces, to increase the general purpose forces, the resources for the strategic movement of troops, reserves of armed forces and special troops, to establish civil defense and an antimissile defense system and to prepare to conduct various types of wars and not just an all-out nuclear war.

In 1962, the operations plan of strategic goals was revised and this now proceeded from the necessity of making the first strike by the U.S. and its allied forces and the complete destruction of the means of the USSR retaliatory strike.⁹ The new strategy was adopted by all NATO countries.

At the same time the military-strategic concepts were revised, and the basic ones in the 1960's were the following:

"Measured use of force" which envisaged not the automatic commitment of all the weapons but merely the portion necessary for achieving a specific political or strategic goal. The limit of this measure was not designated;

"Limited damage" or "inacceptable response." Its essence was to make a strike against the enemy so that it would be able to employ for retaliation only an insignificant portion of its weapons or would be confronted with the dilemma of the undesirability or inadvisability of a retaliatory strike;

"Guaranteed destruction." This concept is basic in American strategy, as it is aimed at achieving the end result of destroying the enemy under any conditions, even in the event of a nuclear strike against U.S. installations. It has been proposed as a defensive concept, however in reality it has required the establishing of a military potential which would be capable in any situations of ensuring the guaranteed destruction of the enemy.

The Nixon Administration concluded that in the United States the role of military strength was being revised and the system of preparing the armed forces did not ensure the attaining of the main political goals. All of this caused them to recognize the "flexible response" strategy as not conforming to the spirit of the times and to formulate for the 1970's its own "more realistic" one. After the proclaiming of the Nixon Guam Doctrine in 1969 which demanded the forming of a U.S. policy which would rest on three components-- partnership, strength (military) and talks, the adopting of the strategy of "realistic containment" ("realistic deterrence") was announced.

The new strategy, like the "flexible response" strategy, was based on the idea of war against the USSR and the socialist commonwealth countries, however it had a more aggressive nature. The ideas of making nuclear strikes were incorporated in the integrated operations plan No 5 adopted in December 1975. This envisaged the making of strikes against 25,000 targets on the territory of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries.¹⁰

The concept of "strategic sufficiency" was proclaimed as the basic concept in the new strategy. This assumed the presence of a military might which would be capable of causing to the potential enemy losses which would be sufficient to restrain it from attack (that is, it maintained a tenet from the "guaranteed destruction" concept).

Certain changes occurred in the views on preparations for a future war. In 1970, the Pentagon abandoned the concept of "two-and-a-half wars" (a major war in Europe, a major war in Asia and a minor one in any other region) which had been adopted at the beginning of the 1960's and took up a new one of "a war and a half" determined the areas for developing the general purpose forces needed to conduct one major war (against the USSR) and one minor, limited or local war in another region where this would be caused by political advisability and an extraordinary situation. The half-war, as before, directly envisaged the suppression of the national liberation movement in the developing countries.

As a concession to the American "hawks," still one other concept was adopted of "strategic mobility." This demanded an additional strengthening of the means for delivering troops by air and sea and ensuring their rapid transporting to the theater of war or to an area of military conflict. This reinforced the concept of "a war and a half" and justified the idea of "dual basing" where equipment was stored in the areas of assumed operations while the personnel would be ferried from the United States. On the basis of this concept,

construction has been continued on new military bases and various commands have been set up.

The Carter Administration in terms of the new conditions resurrected the "flexible response" strategy, having termed it a strategy of "compensatory counter-action" (1977-1980). The main content of the new strategy which was set forward in numerous speeches by the Washington leaders and finally reflected in Carter's Directive No 59 of 15 July 1980 was to achieve an "acceptable version" of nuclear war with the USSR and gain the most advantageous conditions for employing the entire U.S. nuclear potential. It required that any "Soviet advantages" be compensated for by U.S. advantages in other indicators. Here was the rebirth of the policy of outright American interventionism. Official Washington, without concealing the aggressive nature of the new strategic ideas, initiated a broad military program, particularly in the area of updating the sea and land components of the strategic triad and made adjustments in the weaponry development plans.

The new "Single Integrated Plan for Target Allocation" (SIOP-5D) had already designated 40,000 targets on the territory of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. Here variations were planned for the attacks depending upon the decision of the leadership, the situation and the set goals, and in addition the retargeting of missiles from some objects to others was planned and tasks were set for increasing their number, improving the quality, the strike accuracy and other parameters ensuring the achieving of supremacy. A fundamental decision was taken to carry out the plans on the actual employment of the enormous U.S. nuclear arsenal for achieving hegemonistic aspirations on the world scene. However, the U.S. reactionary forces were dissatisfied by the military measures carried out by Carter.

The Reagan Administration, in coming to power, worked out its own strategy of "direct confrontation" (1981) and undertook a number of steps aimed at strengthening the preparations of the nation and the armed forces for war, at exacerbating the international situation and at a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The essence of the new strategy set forward by the U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinburger and subsequently by Reagan as well comes down to a direct clash between the United States and the USSR on global and regional scales. The idea of achieving U.S. military supremacy determines the basic focus of the strategy. For this reason military might as before is considered to be the main factor for ensuring U.S. world domination. Basic attention is given to a rapid build-up of the material base for initiating wars of various scales. A wager has been made on the development of strategic offensive and defensive forces, the general purpose forces and their reserve components and on strengthening the defense of command bodies and the means of communications.

On the basis of the adopted strategy, new military-strategic concepts are being worked out and the old ones are making a reappearance. The task has been set of preparing the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct any war (nuclear and conventional, short and extended, limited and total, local and universal, two-sided and coalition) and to participate in any of the possible conflicts.

The "direct confrontation" strategy has incorporated those concepts which were aimed at a further arms race, at the destruction or weakening of the USSR and the other socialist countries and at their disarmament.

A new content has been injected into the concept of "universal (total) forces" advanced by M. Laird in 1971. This defines the basic principles in the integration and build-up of military potentials in the coalition of imperialist countries headed by the United States and makes provision for the coordinating of measures and its allies both in the area of the organizational development of the armed forces and on the questions of their deployment, training and logistics. Here the United States in the organizational development of its armed forces has focused its main efforts on the development of the nuclear forces, the Air Force and the Navy and has demanded that the allies increase their military capability, primarily the ground forces, and also increase the overall contribution to the arms race.

The concept of "essential equality" (more frequently employed as the concept of "essential equivalence") views the measures to increase and improve the entire arsenal of weapons and to increase their survivability and effectiveness and defines the effective strength and areas of developing the U.S. strategic offensive forces in the aim of achieving an indisputable superiority over the Soviet Union. These forces, in the Pentagon's view, should possess the ability to achieve "guaranteed destruction" of the coalition of enemy states by making a pre-emptive massed nuclear strike. Fitting in with this concept is the decision to produce neutron and laser weapons, binary chemical ammunition, to build up NATO and deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and to develop new missiles and reconnaissance-attack complexes.

The concept of "geographic escalation" envisages the extending of military operations into all areas where the interests of the socialist countries are involved. For this purpose areas are also being defined for the development of armed forces which should be capable of rapidly initiating military operations and conduct them for an extended time where this is considered necessary by the U.S. political leadership, not excluding the employment of all conventional, nuclear, chemical and other types of weapons. In this concept a particular role has been assigned to the "Rapid Deployment Forces."

The new strategy and the currently existing military-strategic concepts are the most aggressive and dangerous. They reflect the desire of American imperialism to conduct an across-the-board offensive against socialism and the national liberation movement. This gives rise to the danger of further confrontation and the outbreak of a new world war.

The nuclear maniacs have had no interest and have no interest in the fate of mankind. As can be seen from the examined basic military-strategic concepts, in the forefront is a pre-emptive nuclear strike in the aim of catching the enemy unaware, of disrupting control, preventing retaliatory actions and ultimately achieving victory and the attaining of political goals. The idea of world domination has gone so far that many regions have been declared or are declared as vitally important for U.S. "national interests." The U.S. is endeavoring to broaden the zones of activity of the aggressive blocs and is working out a unified approach to employing the entire military potential of the capitalist world in its own interests for the struggle against the socialist commonwealth. The decision of Reagan to develop space weapons is a new evil program.

While previously U.S. aggressiveness was somewhat hidden behind "peace-loving phrases," at present Washington, in continuing to show its "peacefulness," is widely publicizing its military plans for the purpose of demonstrating its strength. Information is intentionally leaked and Reagan's "all-encompassing nuclear rearmament program" and enormous military expenditures are being discussed. A number of important and secret documents, such as, for example, the "directive in the defense area for the 1984-1988 fiscal year" have been made public. This document directly sets the task of "defeating the Soviet Union on any level of a military conflict from insurgency operations to nuclear war," and states that "the United States should be able to get the upper hand over the Soviet Union, even if the conflict is extended."¹¹

The Reagan Administration is betting directly on nuclear war leading to a universal catastrophe, and is endeavoring to keep the peoples of the world in a state of shock, and in particular to intimidate the socialist commonwealth nations. If the American politicians are thinking of frightening the USSR and the socialist states by a new threat of nuclear war, then they should have a look at the history of our people. They have never feared a threat and difficulties.

"We know and properly assess the policy of the imperialists," said the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, in replying to the questions of a TASS correspondent, "their attitude toward the socialist countries, and we will never forget the tragedy for people in a policy of 'appeasement' of the aggressor. In mentioning this, we are obliged to take measures and respond to the increased nuclear threat. We must respond in such a manner that a feeling of self-preservation prevails over the intention of a potential aggressor to unleash aggression against us."¹²

Reagan's militaristic course has been condemned among a large number of U.S. politicians and ordinary Americans, among scholars, physicians, other specialists and public organizations of the states of the world. The antiwar movement is growing in the world. The wagering on force even by certain rightists in the West is recognized as absurd and unrealistic.

In assessing the aggressive Reagan course, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, said: "...The present U.S. Administration is continuing to follow an extremely dangerous course. The questions of war and peace cannot be dealt with so flippantly. All attempts to achieve military supremacy over the USSR are in vain. The Soviet Union will never allow this and it will never be unarmed when confronted by any threat. Let this be clearly understood in Washington. It is time for them to cease imagining all sorts of new variations of how to better start a nuclear war in the hope of winning it. This exercise is not merely irresponsible but also absurd."¹³

The USSR has struggled and will struggle for peace and equal collaboration, for noninterference into the internal affairs of other states and the resolving of all disputed problems by peaceful means, for an equal reduction in weapons, for maintaining the existing military equilibrium on a lower level, for renouncing the use of nuclear weapons first and for preventing the militarizing of space.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "SShA: voyenno-strategicheskiye kontseptsii" [The United States: Military-Strategic Concepts], Moscow, Nauka, 1980, p 41.
- ² "Zloveshchaya estafeta" [An Evil Succession], Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p 55.
- ³ Ibid., pp 14, 87; N. N. Yakovlev, "TsRU protiv SSSR" [The CIA against the USSR], Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1983, p 25.
- ⁴ G. A. Trofimenko, "Voyennaya doktrina SShA" [U.S. Military Doctrine], Moscow, Znaniye. International Series, No 6, 1982, p 10.
- ⁵ "Zloveshchaya estafeta," p 120.
- ⁶ Ibid., pp 121-124, 153-155.
- ⁷ "SShA: voyenno-strategicheskiye kontseptsii," p 206.
- ⁸ Quoted in: G. A. Trofimenko, op. cit., pp 16-17.
- ⁹ Ibid., pp 19-20.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p 31.
- ¹¹ KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 January 1983.
- ¹² Ibid., 31 July 1983.
- ¹³ PRAVDA, 27 March 1983.

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SOVIET TROOPS IN GERMANY HOLD JOURNAL READER CONFERENCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 83-84

[Unattributed article: "From the Reader Conferences of the GSVG"]

[Text] On 12-15 July 1983, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSVG] held reader conferences on the materials of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. Participating in their work were generals and officers from the staffs and political bodies and the most active readers from the troops.

In the course of the conferences, photo exhibits were organized and these showed the main episodes in the most important operations and combat actions of the most distinguished formations and units during the Great Patriotic War. The conferences, as a rule, ended with the showing of historical patriotic films with a depiction of the campaign record of the formation (field force) and the viewing of the exhibits of the museums and combat glory rooms.

Taking an active part in the preparation and holding of the conferences were: Lt Gen P. I. Gusev, Lt Gen Avn V. I. Korobov, Maj Gen A. V. Yermakov, Maj Gen Avn V. N. Meshcheryakov, Cols Ye. M. Gaydukevich and V. V. Fomin, Lt Col A. M. Tren' and others.

The conferences were held in an organized manner and on a high ideological and theoretical level. The speeches of their participants were closely tied to the historic decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and to the speech at it by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov.

Lt Gen P. I. Gusev, in praising the publications of the journal, drew attention to the necessity of coordinating the articles and military history work as a whole with the operational and combat training of the staffs and troops. He recommended that the editors more widely take up the experience of local wars, particularly since World War II, and on this basis disclose the trends and patterns in the development in the forms and methods of combat considering the use of modern weapons. The pages of the journal should more boldly examine the questions of military economics.

Lt Gen Avn V. I. Korobov, in highly praising the published articles, particularly on the subject "Military-Theoretical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and the

Leading Role of the CPSU in Military Organizational Development," was in favor of broadening the contacts of the authors and readers with representatives of the journal's editors and editorial board. In his opinion, regular meetings and a reciprocal exchange of opinions with the readers would make the magazine more interesting, it would raise the authority of the published materials and help it more boldly pose problem questions of military history and increase their importance in the practical activities of the troops. This, in turn, would evoke interest in the journal and broaden the range of its readers.

Engr-Maj Gen Yu. B. Ivanov pointed to the timeliness of the articles published on the technical support of combat operations and the possibility of employing the experience described in these in the operational training of the troops. The speaker wished that the journal would pay more attention to the questions of evacuating damaged weapons and military equipment from the battlefield from the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the organizing of technical reconnaissance and the use of the local industrial facilities in the interests of technical support for combat operations. Also to be taken up would be the experience of employing the repair bodies in various types of combat.

Maj Gen S. U. Beppayev, while praising the article describing the combat employment of tank troops in breaking through the prepared enemy defenses during the period of the Great Patriotic War, voiced an opinion on the advisability of stating in them, albeit briefly, the tactics of the opposing side and to accompany the given material with illustrative diagrams.

Col E. M. Vovk drew attention to the need for the journal to publish, along with materials showing the positive experience, others which would contain an analysis of the basic reasons for unsuccessful operations in order to consider the errors and not make them in the future. He also proposed that the link of history with modern times be more widely taken up, that is, show how the experience of the war is refracted in the current regulations.

Col V. I. Shurov, in speaking about the importance of the moral and psychological training of flight personnel, expressed a desire for the journal to provide a series of articles on the methods of training and shaping up pilots after their graduation from schools and return from hospitals. He also requested that the questions of the cooperation of aviation with ground forces from the experience of the Great Patriotic War and local wars be more widely taken up.

Col A. M. Starikov voiced an opinion on the need for the journal to publish materials on the particular features of control over the coalition units and formations from the experience of the Great Patriotic War and engineer support for the operations of tank formations in exploiting the success in the course of operations.

Col V. V. Khoroshilov feels it advisable to pay more attention to the questions of planning operations during the years of the last war. The speaker took up the need to treat military history experience, showing in what manner it is employed in major exercises and maneuvers.

Col A. I. Shevtsov recommended that the subject be more specifically dealt with in articles on party-political work and patriotic indoctrination. In the future he would like to see on the journal's pages materials from the history of organizing party-political work during the years of the Civil War and Great Patriotic War as well as on the positive experience of organizing and conducting this in the postwar period.

Lt Col V. G. Pugachev voiced a desire to continue publishing articles on the experience of combat operations by mobile groups with a compulsory dealing with the questions of the organization and realization of their rear support.

Col V. P. Dogalev in his speech analyzed the articles devoted to increasing the survivability of armored equipment and expressed certainty that certain aspects of this problem in the future would be taken up on the journal's pages considering the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Col A. N. Alekseyev felt it useful for the journal to publish articles on generalizing and analyzing the experience of the Great Patriotic War in the area of employing smokescreens for camouflaging the areas of crossing water obstacles and other objects as well as the experience of employing flamethrower and incendiary weapons, particularly in city fighting and as part of the anti-tank reserves.

Col V. I. Romanov, in analyzing the conditions for conducting operations in cities and areas with mass construction, requested that the journal's editors pay more attention to taking up the experience of fighting in a city.

Lt Col L. N. Shevlyakov in his speech pointed out that under the conditions of the sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle and international tension, when bourgeois propaganda in its subversive activities against socialism has turned nationalism into one of its main ploys, the questions of the patriotic and international indoctrination of the Armed Forces personnel assumed particular importance. In this regard, it is essential to continue publishing articles of a military-patriotic nature.

Cols B. V. Levitskiy, A. I. Frolov, A. I. Yefimov, G. I. Skripka and O. M. Soltyevskiy voiced requests that the journal publish more articles on reconnaissance, deception, radio electronic countermeasures, cooperation between the all-arms and artillery units (subunits) in all-arms combat, as well as on the tactics and operational employment of the troops of foreign armies, proceeding from the experience of local wars and major exercises.

Participating in the work of the conferences was the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal, Maj Gen M. P. Shmelev. He acquainted the conference participants with the journal's subject plan for 1983-1984 and answered reader questions.

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BOOK REVIEWED ON SOVIET BREAKTHROUGH TO HARBIN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 27 Sep 83) pp 85-87

[Review by Col A. Degtyarev of the book "Proryv na Kharbin" (Breakthrough to Harbin) by A. P. Beloborodov, Voenizdat, 1982, 208 pages]

[Text] "The Breakthrough to Harbin" is the title of the book by the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen A. P. Beloborodov, on the combat operations of Soviet troops in the Far East against imperialist Japan, published by Voenizdat.

In the summer of 1945, A. P. Beloborodov was appointed the commander of the 1st Red Banner Army involved in the Manchurian Strategic Operation. This ended with the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The victorious conclusion of this operation lasting from 9 August through 2 September 1945 forced militaristic Japan to surrender unconditionally. This is why at present this operation has attracted the attention of military researchers and historians. In the West, the bourgeois falsifiers of history treat the Manchurian Operation in a distorted light, endeavoring in every possible way to play down the crucial role of the Soviet Army in the defeat of the basic forces of militaristic Japan, the imperialist aggressor in the East. They have endeavored to show that the entry by the Soviet Union into the war against Japan and the participation of the Soviet troops in the defeat of the basic forces of the Japanese Army were not of a decisive nature.

The author of the present memoirs convincingly unmask such assertions. For this reason, his book is very pertinent and timely. In showing the strategic scope of the operation, A. P. Beloborodov writes that the combat operations in Manchuria developed over an area of more than a million km². Moreover, the physico-geographic conditions of this area were extremely difficult. The terrain abounded in numerous precipitous mountains, tayga thickets and impassable swamps. The river valleys were flooded by the summer high water. The Japanese had built numerous permanent fortifications in the sectors accessible for the operations of our troops. In Manchuria there was more than 1 million enemy troops with numerous detachments of fanatical suicide soldiers.

But all of this collapsed under the crushing blows of the Soviet troops. Even in the second day, the Japanese front and army staff lost control of the troops

and by the end of the first week of combat operations, the Kwantung Army, one-fifth of all the Japanese ground forces had suffered a defeat. Its soldiers began to surrender in large groups. This put the Japanese fronts in North and Central China in a critical situation. Militaristic Japan was forced to surrender. Thus, the Soviet Army which had played the chief role in the defeat of Nazi Germany made a decisive contribution to the victory over imperialist Japan.

By the spring of 1945, the Japanese armed forces, regardless of the losses suffered at sea, had still maintained high battleworthiness. They possessed large formations of various branches of troops, including the strong Kwantung Army. For this reason, the Allied Command felt that combat operations against Japan would be drawn out for a long time to come. It assumed the crushing of Japanese resistance not earlier than 1946. Later dates of 1947 and even 1948 were mentioned. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war immediately altered the entire course of combat operations in the East. The crushing blow by the Soviet troops against the Kwantung Army became the crucial thing in achieving a rapid and complete victory over imperialist Japan.

Of great interest, particularly for the military readers, is the chapter "The Two Main Strikes." It deals with the overall plan and decision of the command of the 1st Red Banner Army to break through the enemy defenses on a broad front, to cross the inaccessible sector of mountain tayga and reach the areas where the Japanese Command did not expect the appearance of our troops. The author of the memoirs, relying on the experience of conducting the major operations against the Nazi invaders and using the conclusions and recommendations of Soviet military science, thoroughly backs up this decision.

On 9 August, at 0100 hours, the troops of the 1st Red Banner Army under heavy rain crossed the frontier and along seven routes advanced over the tayga. The author describes in detail the difficulties of offensive combat. It was essential to conduct engineer reconnaissance for laying the column tracks. Here is how he describes the situation: "Imagine for a minute: total darkness, the heavy rain, the steep slippery slopes alternate with swamps, all around are forests covered with dead wood and interwoven with lianas and naturally there were no landmarks except the magnetic indicator of the compass" (p 93).

The author describes with great emotion the feats of the Soviet officers, sergeants and soldiers, their great professional training, physical endurance and their ability to quickly and faultlessly find the correct solution in a difficult combat situation. The book emphasizes that the heroism of the Soviet soldiers was based on their ideological conviction and total dedication to the motherland. The feat of the combat engineer, Pfc Vasilii Kolesnik, is thoroughly described. During the night, as part of a combat engineer group, he built passageways through the wire obstacles, clearing them of enemy mines. Vasilii Kolesnik carried out this assignment successfully. But he assumed a second combat task without waiting for an order, upon the command of his Komsomol heart. Having used up all the grenades, he blocked the embrasure of an enemy pillbox with his body. Not long before this, replying to a letter from his mother, Vasilii Kolesnik has written: "Mama! I heard your voice, my elder. If the motherland orders I will carry out my soldier duty. You will never be ashamed of your son." And Vasilii Kolesnik by his blood confirmed these words. Posthumously he was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the following chapters of the book, the author describes the storming of a number of fortified areas, the complete defeat of the Japanese troops, the surrender of the Kwantung Army and the entry of our units into the city of Harbin. All these chapters contain interesting facts and specific examples which show the great liberating mission of the Soviet Army.

In a number of places the author again and again shows the valor and courage of the Soviet soldiers who were profoundly aware of their patriotic duty. The soldiers and commanders fought unstintingly against an army the personnel of which for a long time had developed a spirit of samurai fanaticism and shameless chauvinism. In this duel, one could feel the indisputable moral superiority of the Soviet troops indoctrinated in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and in a spirit of wholehearted dedication to the cause of the Communist Party.

In describing the course of the Manchurian Operation, the author emphasized that the enemy was not weak. He intentionally focuses attention on this because among some there still is an opinion of the easy victory in the Manchurian Offensive Operation.

In a number of places the memoirs of A. P. Beloborodov touch on the question of the atrocities of the Japanese militarists on Chinese land. During the occupation the Japanese had turned the city of Mudanjiang into a center of colonial plunder in this part of Manchuria. All the city enterprises belonged here to only Japanese. The Chinese had been allocated the role of coolies, shoe cleaners, garbagemen and so forth. In Mudanjiang Province, the Japanese colonialists had taken over the area with fertile soil. But how could they drive out the Chinese peasants? The Japanese authorities sent in a punitive expedition with artillery and in several days exterminated 85,000 persons, sparing neither the women, the elderly or the children.

The Japanese officers in retreating destroyed their own wounded soldiers. They even killed Japanese children and women under the pretext that they not be taken prisoner. Thus, in the region of Jixi and Didaohe Stations, more than 400 murdered children and women were discovered. With good reason the Japanese refugees including elderly, women and children in crowds came forward to meet the Soviet troops and sought protection from them.

At present, all of this is now history, a terrible and cruel one. But from this history the peoples draw conclusions and lessons. However, certain circles in Japan are trying to force the Japanese, particularly the youth to forget the past. They in every possible way justify the predatory wars by the Japanese militarists and conceal the truth of their misdeeds. Moreover, the ruling circles of Japan, in conspiring with the American imperialists, are openly resurrecting the policy of militarism and are doing everything possible to turn their state into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and into the major nuclear beachhead of the Pentagon in Asia for carrying out its aggressive goals. In this context the memoirs of A. P. Beloborodov serve as a cruel reminder of the danger of such a course for those who in their militaristic ambitions forget the lessons of the last war.

The book "Proryv na Kharbin" is also instructive for the ordinary soldier and for the commander. This is not the first work by A. P. Beloborodov. The

previous works, in particular the book "Vsegda v boyu" [Always in Combat] he devoted to the combat operations of the Soviet troops against the Nazi invaders. And one must pay proper due to the author for the fact that he has actively generalized and passed on the experience of the last war to the present generation of Soviet soldiers.

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BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON ARMY GEN A. L. GETMAN PROVIDED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 83 (signed to press 17 Sep 83) pp 94-96

[Article by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen I. Gusakovskiy:
"Army Gen A. L. Getman (on the 80th Anniversary of His Birthday)"]

[Text] The combat biography of Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen Andrey Lavrent'yevich Getman is full of vivid events¹ and it is not easy to cover them fully in a short article. Some 59 years of the life of this prominent Soviet military chief and member of the CPSU since 1927 have been inseparably linked to our glorious Armed Forces. He joined the ranks of the motherland's defenders in September 1924, having become an officer candidate in the School of Red Master Sergeants imeni VTsIK of the Ukraine. Constant study produced results: A. L. Getman came out of this school as a militarily and politically intelligent commander of the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA]. For 3 years he successfully commanded a platoon in the Bogun 130th Rifle Regiment of the Red Banner Kiev 44th Rifle Division and then became a course commander in the School of Red Master Sergeants. The outstanding abilities as an indoctrinator of the personnel, discipline and a desire to constantly broaden his military and political knowledge did not remain unnoticed. In 1933, as one of the best commanders of the Red Army, he was enrolled as a student of the Military Academy for Mechanization and Motorization of the RKKA. Andrey Lavrent'yevich studied with great intensity, skillfully combining studies with party and social work.

After completing the academy in 1937, A. L. Getman in 1938-1941 successively held a series of staff and command positions in the Far East. He was appointed the chief of staff of a mechanized brigade and a mechanized corps and the commander of a tank brigade. In the position of deputy commander of the 2d Mechanized Brigade in August 1939, he participated in defeating the Japanese

¹ A. L. Getman was born on 5 October 1903 in the village of Klepaly, now in Burynskiy Rayon of Sumi Oblast, in a peasant family. After completing rural school, he worked for more than 4 years as a common laborer at a sugar refinery and then at the Vorozhba Railroad Station. (For more information about A. L. Getman, see: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, pp 117-120.)

invaders on the Khalkhin-Gol River. For courage and valor the motherland awarded him the Order of the Red Star and the Mongolian government presented him with the Order of the Red Banner.

In September 1941, Andrey Lavrent'yevich became the commander of the 112th Tank Division. At the beginning of November 1941, the division was on the defensive to the southwest of Podolsk ready to repel enemy strikes. But its combat operations started not by the defensive but rather with an offensive. In the aim of eliminating a Nazi breakthrough in the area of Kashira, an operational group of troops was established under the command of Gen P. A. Belov; this included the II Cavalry Corps, the 112th Tank Division and other formations. The group had a mission of disengaging near Serpukhov, making a march to the Kashira area and preventing the advance of the enemy 17th Tank Division toward Moscow.

By the morning of 26 November, the 112th Tank Division had concentrated its basic forces to the southwest of Kashira and had initiated combat with the enemy. During the day the tank troops of the formation under the command of Andrey Lavrent'yevich firmly held the occupied defensive line and after the arrival from the Serpukhov area of formations from the II Cavalry Corps, the 173d Rifle Division and the 9th Tank Brigade, the troops of the operational group with air support on 27 November made a counterstrike against the enemy 17th Tank Division and threw it back to the area of Mordves.

Having sustained a setback in the area of Kashira, the Nazis tried with the forces of two tank divisions to outflank Tula on the northeast. For eliminating this threat, the 112th Tank Division (without the 124th Tank Regiment) received a new mission: to make a march to the area of Shulgino and together with the 340th Rifle Division of Col S. S. Martirosyan which was arriving from the reserves, on 5 December, to make a counterstrike against the enemy.

The fierce battle lasted almost 24 hours. Attacked by units of these formations from the north and by the troops of rifle divisions from the 50th Army and the 124th Tank Regiment of the 112th Tank Division from the south, the enemy was forced to initially abandon the Tula--Moscow Highway and later also the railroad. Subsequently, the division operating as part of the mobile group of the 50th Army broke into Kaluga and held it until the arrival of the main forces. For successes in the battles in the course of the Moscow Battle, the formation under the command of A. L. Getman was one of the first to receive the Order of the Red Banner. After the war the inhabitants of Tula and Kaluga elected A. L. Getman an honorary citizen of their cities.

In April 1942, Andrey Lavrent'yevich headed the VI Tank Corps. In the summer of 1943, this formation, as part of the 1st Tank Army, took an active part in defeating the Nazi troops on the Kursk Salient. During days of intense defensive battles on the Kursk Salient, the talent of Andrey Lavrent'yevich as a military leader was most fully disclosed. He relied constantly on the creative initiative of the commanders and political workers. Andrey Lavrent'yevich organically combined equanimity and calmness with a tenacity in achieving the set goal.

In the course of the counteroffensive, the men of the corps demonstrated examples of heroism and combat skill. On 7 August 1943, on the central square, the inhabitants of the city of Bogodukhov liberated by the VI Tank Corps presented its commander with bread and salt.

For skillful leadership of the troops of the corps in the course of the Kursk Battle, A. L. Getman received the Order of Suvorov 2d Degree and on 21 August 1943, he was given the military rank of lieutenant general of the tank troops. For steadfastness and courage shown in the battles on the Kursk Salient, the VI Tank Corps became the 11th Guards.

The formation under the command of Gen A. L. Getman participated in the Zhitomir-Berdichev, Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy, Proskorovo-Chernoftsy and Lwow-Sandomierz Operations.

In commanding large tank formations, A. L. Getman successfully controlled them in committing them to breakthroughs and in actions in the operational depth. Rich combat experience helped Andrey Lavrent'yevich successfully carry out tasks also in the position of first deputy commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army which participated in the Vistula-Oder, Pomeranian and Berlin Operations.

After the Great Patriotic War, A. L. Getman successively held the positions of the commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Urals and Transcaucasian Military Districts, he was the chief of staff and deputy chief of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army and commander of the Separate Mechanized Corps; from 1958 through 1964, he was the commander of the Carpathian Military District.

From June 1964 through January 1972, A. L. Getman headed the DOSAAF Central Committee. He did a great deal to turn this mass volunteer society into a real school for the military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet youth.

Since January 1972, Army Gen A. L. Getman has been a military inspector and advisor of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government have highly regarded the combat activities of A. L. Getman, having presented him with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, six Orders of the Red Banner, the Orders of Suvorov 2d Degree, Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy 2d Degree, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces" 3d Degree and many medals. He has also received an Honorary Weapon and foreign decorations.

At the 22d, 23d and 24th CPSU Congresses he was elected a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and was a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, 5th-8th Sittings.

He has written the books "O voinskoy dolge i soldatskoy sluzhbe" [On Military Duty and a Soldier's Service], "Vospitaniye muzhestva" [The Indoctrination of Courage] and "Tanki idut na Berlin" [Tanks are Moving on Berlin]. In these

and other works by him, Andrey Lavrent'yevich in an accessible and emotional manner has told of the difficult military service during years of harsh testing and peaceful construction. At present, A. L. Getman is carrying out great work in the area of the military patriotic indoctrination of the workers.

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